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I. ANTIFOUNDATIONALISM AND CONTEMPORARY JURISPRUDENCE
A. Where We Are
A pervasive theme of recent legal theory is profound skepticism
about the possibility of consensus in social values and goals.
2
Accompanying such skepticism is multifaceted doubt about
objectivity, rationality, and the possibility of social progress.
3
Skeptical theorists reject the idea of shared intellectual foundations
and therefore are generally called antifoundationalists.
4
2 This theme, and the various social and legal arguments that elaborate it, are at
the heart of critical theory-which embraces critical legal theory, critical feminism, and
critical race studies. Mark Kelman, for example, says that from the standpoint of
critical legal studies, mainstream (liberal) legal thought is in fact beset "not by
'competing concerns' artfully balanced until a wise equilibrium is reached, but by
irreducible, irremediable, irresolvable conflict." MARK KELMAN, A GUIDE TO CRITICAL
LEGAL STUDIES 3 (1987). Martha Minow cites the philosophers AJ. Ayer and W.V.
Quine for the proposition that "although we can alter the theory we use to frame our
perceptions of the world, we cannot see the world unclouded by preconceptions. The
impact of the observer's perspective may be crudely oppressive. Yet, we continue to
believe in neutrality." Martha Minow, Foreword: Justice Engendered, 101 HARV. L. REV.
10, 46 (1987). See also MariJ. Matsuda, Looking to the Bottom: Critical Legal Studies
and Reparations 22 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 323 (1987) (commenting on the
irreducible distinctiveness of racial points of view); Robin L. West, The Difference in
Women's Hedonic Lives: A Phenomenological Critique of Feminist Legal Theory, 3 WIS.
WOMEN'S L.J. 81 (1987) (discussing the irreducible experiential differences between
men and women and the perceptions that follow from them).
3 Although critical writers generally attack objectivity claims, they frequently take
different positions on the notion of social progress. Catharine MacKinnon echoes
many other writers when she says that the notion of objectivity is used to mask "such
power over reality as comes from methodological hegemony over the means of
knowing." CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE
107 (1989). On the question of social progress, compare Robert Gordon's
observation that the core of traditional liberal thought is the idea that "[t]here is an
objective, determined, progressive social evolutionary path" with the confidence of
many feminist and critical race theorists that their work brings us closer to a genuine
understanding and implementation of equality. Robert W. Gordon, Critical Legal
Histories, 36 STAN. L. REV. 57, 61 (1984).
" Debates between legal foundationalists and antifoundationalists reflect pervasive
movements in philosophy. Richard Rorty describes and promotes an antifoundation-
alist approach to traditional philosophical issues. He describes antifoundationalism
as the view that
the notion of knowledge as accurate representation, made possible by
special mental processes, and intelligible through a general theory of
representation, needs to be abandoned.
[T]he attempt (which has defined traditional philosophy) to explicate
.rationality' and 'objectivity' in terms of conditions of accurate represen-
tation is a self-deceptive effort to eternalize the normal discourse of the
day...
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Antifoundationalist arguments have so thoroughly taken hold of
the legal imagination that contemporary legal theory seems
discontinuous with its quite recent past. This discontinuity has two
aspects. First, the new jurisprudence sees the old jurisprudence as
naive and superficial, especially in its treatment of value consen-
sus. 5 The aim of the new theorists is not to answer and refute
positivism and liberalism, but to subvert them.6 Second, the new
jurisprudence is only tangentially about law and legal reasoning;
instead, it is primarily about language, thought, and will, about
meaning and truth. Legal implications are treated almost as
incidental.7
The transition from the old to the new jurisprudence, best
exemplified by critical theory, involves three kinds of destabilizing
arguments-arguments that in turn defend moral, conceptual, and
semantic relativity.8 The moral argument destabilizes liberalism
RICHARD RORTY, PHILOSOPHY AND THE MIRROR OF NATURE 6, 11 (1979).
5 Many writers go further and characterize liberal assumptions about value
consensus as devious and repressive. The dominant groups in society, on this view,
universalize their interests and experience and repress the self-expression of groups
(e.g. women and minorities) without power. According to Robert Gordon, one can
represent law as a legitimating ideology in the view that "[t]he ruling class induces
consent and demobilizes opposition by masking its role in widely shared utopian
norms and fair procedures, which it then distorts to its own purposes." Gordon,
supra note 3, at 93. Gordon himself seems to proffer an account wherein these
preferences are concealed even from the actors themselves because "[t]he discourse
of law-its categories, arguments, reasoning modes, rhetorical tropes, and procedural
rituals-fits into a complex of discursive practices that together structure how people
perceive." Id. at 95.
6 In the introduction to Postmodern Jurisprudence, Douzinas and Warrington
observe that
[t]he orthodoxjurisprudence of modernity constructs theories that portray
the law as a coherent body of rules and principles.... Its predominant
strategy is to try and weave the legal texts into a single, seamless veil ....
In this, postmodern theory could not be more different. It distrusts all
attempts to create large-scale, totalising theories in order to explain social
phenomena .... It tells small-scale, provisional, open stories about our lives
and the world .... [Therefore,] the bodies of theory brought together here
are not staging a confrontation."
COSTAS DOUZINAS ET AL., POSTMODERNJURISPRUDENCE ix-x (1991).
7 I am not necessarily offering this point as criticism. My examination of
antifoundationalist theories in Part IV of this article is itself a discussion of thought
and will, meaning and truth-applicable generally to deliberative acts of many kinds.
8 These are not three distinct and separate arguments. Arguments for conceptual
relativity tend to generalize arguments for moral relativity. They put forward a
general epistemological position which relativizes both facts and values and which
(perhaps) questions or erodes the distinction between facts and values. Arguments
for semantic relativity focus not so much on thought and understanding as on
1992]
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and faith in public values with an assault on the objectivity of rights,
encapsulated in the claim that all law is politics. 9 The conceptual
argument impeaches ideological neutrality by uncovering multiple
narratives and alternative voices that coexist in time and space and
offer irreconcilable ways of ordering experience. Finally, the
semantic argument undercuts communication with deconstructive
arguments that characterize meaning as hearer-determined.11
The pedigree of antifoundationalism is endlessly disputable.
Any era, suitably interpreted, will yield antecedents. 12 What is
distinctive about contemporary theorists is that they address the
communication, and they raise questions about constancy of meaning across speaker/
hearer, writer/reader dyads.
9 Mark Tushnet, for example, says that
interpretivism and neutral principles attempt to complete the world view of
liberalism by explaining how individuals may form a society. [H]owever,...
the only coherent basis for the requisite continuities of history and meaning
is found in the communitarian assumptions of conservative social
thought.... If I am correct, the liberal account of the social world is
inevitably incomplete, for it proves unable to provide a constitutional theory
of the sort that it demands.
Mark V. Tushnet, Following the Rules Laid Down: A Critique of Interpretivism and
Neutral Principles, 96 HARV. L. REV. 781,785 (1983). Roberto Unger explains how the
liberal account seeks to use the concept of rights:
The rights and principles school.., claims to discern in the leading ideas
of the different branches of law, especially when illuminated by a scrupu-
lous, benevolent, and well-prepared professional elite, the signs of an
underlying moral order that can then serve as the basis for a system of more
or less natural rights.
ROBERTO M. UNGER, THE CRrIcAL LEGAL STUDIES MOVEMENT 13 (1986). Duncan
Kennedy strikes similar notes when he says, "I will use the term liberalism to describe
the mode of mediation or denial that gradually killed off its rivals, before it finally
succumbed to the problems it was designed to solve." Duncan Kennedy, The Structure
of Blackstone's Commentaries, 28 BUFF. L. REV. 209, 216 (1979).
10 Arguments defending conceptual relativity are frequently defended by feminist
theorists and race theorists. For example, in discussing what she calls the "separation
thesis," Robin West concludes that legal theory for men is essentially different in its
fundamental assumptions than it is for women. Robin West,Jursprudence and Gender,
55 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 2-3 (1988). Mari Matsuda argues that race affords a theorist a
particular conceptual scheme and that racial perspective "cuts across class lines....
There is something about color that doesn't wash off as easily as class." Matsuda,
supra note 2, at 360-61.
1 Sanford Levinson comments that in light of "ambiguities of interpretation,
many legal theorists have substituted for the hermeneutics of objective interpretation
what Gerald Graff has termed a 'hermeneutics of power,' where one emphasizes the
political and social determinants of reading texts one way as opposed to another."
INTERPRETING LAW AND LITERATURE xiii (Sanford Levinson & Steven Mailloux eds.,
1988) (quoting Gerald Graff, Textual Leftism, 49 PARTISAN REV. 566 (1982)).
12 Plausible examples include some of the pre-Socratic philosophers, the Sophists,
Nicholas of Cusa, Kierkegaard, and Nietzsche.
UNDERSTANDING DISAGREEMENT
erosion of foundations on all three fronts: moral, conceptual, and
semantic. At least one way of characterizing the elusive and
pervasive notion of postmodernism is by reference to these
arguments and the attitudes they express.
13
Some theorists summarize the destabilizing arguments to
conclude that any pooling of goals and ideals must be the adventi-
tious result of a "conversation" among persons with irreconcilable
ways of thinking.14 At one level removed from substantive theory
(at the level of "How shall we understand what we do?" rather than
the level of "What shall we do?"), the emergent theory of truth and
meaning is a version of pragmatism.1 5 Pragmatists argue that what
is true and has meaning achieves that status provisionally; justifica-
tory arguments for one position or another run out.
16
B. Where We Need to Go
The high priests of antifoundationalism draw inspiration from
the work of the philosopher Ludwig Wittgenstein, 17 much of it
13 See e.g., DOUZINAS, supra note 6, at 3-51 (arguing that modernist discourses of
law contain the unsettling thematics of postmodernity which these texts attempt to
deny); Postmodernism and Law: A Symposium, 62 U. COLO. L. REV. 439-598 (1991).
4 According to Rorty:
[t]o look for commensuration rather than simply continued conversation-to
look for a way of making further redescription unnecessary by finding a way
of reducing all possible descriptions to one-is to attempt escape from
humanity. To abandon the notion that philosophy must show all possible
discourse naturally converging to a consensus.., would be to abandon the
hope of being anything more than merely human.
RORTY, supra note 4, at 376-77.
is For Rorty's definition of pragmatism, see infra text accompanying notes 207-09.
See also Symposium, Renaissance of Pragmatism in American Legal Thought, 63 S. CAL.
L. REV. 1569-1819 (1990) (spelling out the implications of pragmatism for legal
theory).
16 I shall examine how these theoretical moves define a skeptical posture of doubt
about the objectivity of shared values, doubt about one's own impartiality, and doubt
about both discovering the meaning of texts and imparting meaning to texts. The
attitude appropriate to such doubts is modesty about one's goals, understanding, and
powers. Doubts and modesty, on this analysis, are equally appropriate for actors
(judges, attorneys) and theorists. The forms of destabilization affect practical and
theoretical aims equally. And yet this is not the whole story. In both cases, as
feminists and other critical theorists are quick to make clear, cutting loose from
shared values, impartial rules, and fixed meanings also empowers those who do not
share the prevailing values or benefit from the prevailing rules.
17 For the best recent discussion of Wittgenstein's views on philosophy, see
generally ROBERT J. AcKERMAN, WITTGENSTEIN'S CITY (1988). Surprisingly few
writers, however, have addressed Wittgenstein's import for legal theory directly. But
see Stephen Brainerd, The Groundless Assault: A Wittgensteinian Look at Language
.1992]
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filtered through the influential writings of Richard Rorty1 8 and
Stanley Fish. 19 Rorty explicitly and Fish implicitly play upon
Wittgenstein's remarks about the limits of justification and the
constructive character of language. 20 In two respects, however, the
recent appropriation of Wittgenstein's ideas for legal theory has
been deficient.
First, critical theorists have given little attention to the relation-
ship between practice and theory. The relationship, on first
impression, seems well captured by the distinction between being
inside and being outside a way of thinking and being.21 Accord-
ingly, the practitioner takes a way of proceeding for granted, and
the theorist attends self-consciously and critically to the practition-
Structuralism, and Critical Legal Theory, 34 AM. U. L. REV. 1231 (1985) (outlining some
of the intellectual moves that have shaped both critical legal theory in general and
structuralism in particular); Scott Landers, Wittgenstein, Realism, and CLS: Undermin-
ing Rule Skepticism, 9 LAW & PHIL. 177 (1990); Symposium, Legal Theory and
Wittgensteinian Thought, 3 CANADIANJ.L. &JURiS. 3 (1990).
18 See supra notes 4 & 14.
19 Stanley Fish's most important essays are collected in two volumes. See STANLEY
FISH, DOING WHAT COMES NATURALLY (1989) [hereinafter FISH, NATURALLY];
STANLEY FISH, Is THERE A TEXT IN THIS CLASS? (1980) [hereinafter FISH, TEXT]. His
essays on the connections between literary theory and legal theory appear in the
former volume.
20 Wittgenstein makes the following comments on this subject:
189. At some point one has to pass from explanation to mere description.
191. Well, if everything speaks for an hypothesis and nothing against it-is
it then certainly true? One may designate it as such.-But does it certainly
agree with reality, with the facts?-With this question you are already going
round in a circle.
192. To be sure there is justification; but justification comes to an end.
WTGENSTEIN, supra note 1, at 26-27.
21 In The Concept of Law, H.L.A. Hart uses the notion of the "internal aspect" of
rules to distinguish rules from habits:
By contrast [with a habit], if a social rule is to exist some at least must look
upon the behaviour in question as a general standard to be followed by the
group as a whole. A social rule has an 'internal' aspect, in addition to the
external aspect which it shares with a social habit and which consists in the
regular uniform behaviour which an observer could record.
H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 55 (1961). See also NEIL MACCORMICK, LEGAL
REASONING AND LEGAL THEORY 275-92 (1978). My distinction between being inside
or outside a practice differs from Hart's in two respects. First, a theorist who is
outside the practice in my sense has an "internal" point of view in Hart's sense insofar
as she deploys the notion of rules as constraints and guides for action. Second, my
sense of being inside a practice goes further than Hart's "internal aspect." I refer to
individuals within the practice as having a commitment to a particular interpretive
strategy for applying rules and norms in the light of a conception of the purposes
they serve.
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er's way of proceeding. But Wittgenstein himself had well-founded
misgivings about the very possibility of theory. He stressed that all
persons-theorists and practitioners alike-inhabit ways of proceed-
ing (thinking, acting, taking things for granted) and cannot step
outside.22 The possibility of doing anything, including the possi-
bility of propounding theories, depends on inhabiting a way of
speaking and thinking.23 If this is true, then the relationship
between theory and practice may not be an inside/outside relation-
ship but a relationship of two different ways of being inside. To
take this position is the beginning, not the end, of wisdom about
theory and practice and about its acute implications for legal
theory.
24
The second area of concern is that antifoundationalists fail to
appreciate fully the heterogeneous and complex nature of our belief
systems. They assume that a single description or phrase (for
instance, "value-bound" or "conceptually relative") describes all of
one's beliefs collectively. But when we inhabit a way of proceeding
(of thinking, acting, taking'things for granted), we have different
postures toward different beliefs. Our beliefs vary among several
dimensions. One is whether they are controversial. Some beliefs,
including many based on religious, political, or moral convictions,
are inherently controversial and widely disputed; other beliefs, for
example beliefs about historical facts, linguistic definitions, physics
and biology, are often widely shared and little discussed or controverted.
22 According to Wittgenstein:
127. The work of the philosopher consists in assembling reminders for a
particular purpose.
128. If one tried to advance theses in philosophy, it would never be possible
to question them, because everyone would agree to them.
LUDWIG WrTrGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONs 50 (G.E.M. Anscombe trans.,
1953).
220. The reasonable man does not have certain doubts.
221. Can I be in doubt at will?
222. I cannot possibly doubt that I was never in the stratosphere. Does that
make me know it? Does it make it true?
WITTGENSTEIN, supra note 1, at 29.2 3 The position is defended at length by Fish. See supra note 19; cf. JEAN-FRANQOIS
LYOTARD & JEAN-LOUP THBAUD, JUST GAMING 43 (Wlad Godzich trans., 1985)
("[T]here is no outside; there is no place from which one could photograph the whole
thing.").
24 See infra text accompanying notes 62-66.
25 This is obviously an oversimplification. It is more nearly correct to say that
within each area-religion, biology, morality, etc.-some matters are settled (for the
time being) and others are controversial. Nevertheless, the matters that arouse
19921
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A second dimension is centrality to the individual. Some of my
beliefs, whether controversial or not, are closely held. I adhere to
them, it seems, at the price of my own identity and sanity and use
them as tests and justifications for other beliefs. Some of my
beliefs, on the other hand, are easily dislodged by counterargument
or counterexperience.
26
Cutting across these two distinctions among beliefs is a
structural distinction among the indescribably varied ways in which
we use beliefs or facts27 of one kind to support orjustify beliefs of
other kinds. Contemporary theorists pay too little attention to the
important fact that persons have idiosyncratic and individual ways
of sorting knowledge and of reasoning. There is no given ordering
among our beliefs such that some are logically basic or foundation-
al.
For example, we all have beliefs about psychology, history,
economics, physics; about what is good and bad, possible and
impossible, desirable and undesirable, and so on. One person may
support normative conclusions with historical, psychological,
sociological, economic, or moral arguments, or several kinds of
controversy in everyday life characteristically involve moral and political disagree-
ment, while claims about history and science are controversial among those who are
specialists and have a vested interest in a research program.
26 In On Certainty, Wittgenstein repeatedly draws this contrast between proposi-
tions that are in practice empirically tested and those that are fundamental to one's
way of proceeding. Consider the following passages:
55. So is the hypothesis possible, that all the things around us don't exist?
Would that not be like the hypothesis of our having miscalculated in all our
calculations?
446. But why am I so certain that this is my hand? Doesn't the whole
language-game rest on this kind of certainty?
617. Certain events would put me into a position in which I could not go
on with the old language-game any further. In which I was torn away from
the sureness of the game.
Indeed, doesn't it seem obvious that the possibility of a language-game
is conditioned by certain facts?
638. "I can't be making a mistake" is an ordinary sentence, which serves to
give the certainty-value of a statement. And only in its everyday use is it
justified.
W1TrGENSTEIN, supra note 1, at 9, 58, 82, 84.
27 For my purposes it is indifferent whether one uses the term "facts" or "beliefs"
to refer to those matters a person holds true and is prepared tojustify. "Beliefs" is
appropriate when one is calling attention to the intentional status of the proposition.
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arguments intimately combined. A person may use historical
arguments to back economic conclusions (and vice versa), marshall
psychological arguments in historical discourse, explain psychologi-
cal facts with biological ones-or one can forego such reductive
moves.
28
Antifoundationalists generally offer a simple and stream-lined
version of relativism. They disparage references to publicly shared
values without considering the varied justificatory arguments
available to support them. In particular, they dismiss justification
by reference to what is publicly shared and universally accepted as
masking justification by reference to what is preferred by the
individual or the individual's group.29 In fact, both kinds of
justification coexist in deliberative discourse-and a more insightful
version of relativism would examine the way in which individuals
use both kinds ofjustification and how they are constrained by what
is intelligible and acceptable to fellow discussants.3
°
Similarly, antifoundationalist writers offer a simplistic relativism
when they attack the neutrality of conceptual standpoints regardless
of the concepts and arguments at issue. All claims, for them, are
equally partial, disputable, and controvertible moves in a "conversa-
tion."31 The machinery of antifoundationalism thus homogenizes
reasoning in general and legal reasoning in particular, and that
homogeneity is expressed in a pragmatic theory of truth. 2
This characteristic of antifoundationalism is its Achilles' heel,
28 The notion that no domain of knowledge has explanatory priority over others
inherently and objectively has become commonplace in contemporary philosophy.
The prevailingview is that explanatory patterns are determined by the interests of the
inquirer. See, e.g., RICHARD J. BERNSTEIN, BEYOND OBJECTIVISM AND RELATIVISM
(1985); JORGEN HABERMAS, KNOWLEDGE AND HUMAN INTERESTS 196-97 (Jeremy J.
Shapiro trans., 1968); RATIONALITY AND RELATIVISM (Martin Hollis & Stephen Lukes
eds., 1982).
29 A particularly exhaustive attempt to reduce all value justifications to masked
preferences is the critique offered byJohn Hart Ely. SeeJOHN H. ELY, DEMOCRACY
AND DISTRUST 43-72 (1980).
30 This latter and very different kind of relativism is the thesis that I develop and
defend in this article.
" In this way the framework set up by Rorty seems generally applicable. Seesupra
note 14. These matters are discussed at length in Part IV, infra.
32 Another way of expressing this criticism is that simple relativism, which
homogenizes all justificatory strategies and which is expressed by some forms of
pragmatism, represents the point of view of the pure outsider to deliberative
practices. It ignores the complexity ofjustificatory strategies that are incumbent on
any practitioner within a deliberative practice, on someone for whom the distinctions
between partiality and neutrality, personal preference and external norm, etc., remain
coherent distinctions. These points are discussed in Part II, infra.
1992]
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the key to its limits and mistakes in general and as applied within
legal theory. In this article, I analyze those mistakes and propose a
more adequate account of the heterogeneity of reasoning and its
implications. In my view, understanding agreement and disagree-
ment in legal reasoning requires a careful examination of the
relationship between the individual and the group. How are the
reasoning strategies of individuals parasitic upon preexisting
practices? In what sense are the strategies of individuals unique?
How do the variant strategies of individuals produce disagreement
as well as the possibility of addressing such disagreement with
shared concepts? What allows individuals to transcend their own
strategies by using theory to view their practice as a whole? In other
words, I shall describe legal reasoning by looking at it as a "delibera-
tive practice."
The main sections of this article examine legal reasoning to
show the jurisprudential importance of the two problems I have
raised: the inside/outside problem (the relation of practice and
theory) and the heterogeneity of justification and belief. Part II
explains the idea of a deliberative practice, implicitly relying on
Wittgenstein's insights about reasoning, justification, and belief.
Part III demonstrates how the understanding of law as a deliberative
practice helps to resolve several key issues concerning the merits
and defects of a positivist description of law.3 Part IV discusses
the limitations of antifoundationalism and pragmatism by examining
the consequences of their relative inattention to the same two
problems, the inside/outside dilemma and the heterogeneity of
justification. Characterizing law as a deliberative practice sets us on
the road to three goals: (1) giving an elastic and convincing
description of legal reasoning; (2) building bridges between the old
jurisprudence and the new; and (3) examining the foundations of
critical theory by questioning the way in which it claims to destab-
ilize value, conceptual coherence, and meaning.
33 One might reasonably object to calling debates over the nature of law and the
merits of positivism "old"jurisprudence. Among American writers, discussions of
positivism are frequently subsumed under discussions of formalism. See, e.g., THE
RULE OF LAW: IDEAL OR IDEOLOGY (Allan C. Hutchinson & Patrick Monahan eds.,
1987); Frederick Schauer, Formalism, 97 YALE L.J. 509 (1988); Ernestj. Weinrib, Legal
Formalism: On the Immanent Rationality of Law, 97 YALE LJ. 949 (1988).
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II. LAW AS A DELIBERATIVE PRACTICE
The ways in which judges disagree, in method as well as result,
have much in common with other kinds of deliberation; indeed, it
is not misleading to think of deliberation as a genus and judicial
deliberation as its species. In judicial deliberation, or any kind of
deliberation, the relationship of the individual to the group is
problematic. In one sense, the individual follows the same rules of
reasoning as other members of the group and is therefore intelligi-
ble to them. But, in another sense, she has distinct strategies of
understanding and decision-making insofar as she has a unique
history and unique capacities.3
4
Legal philosophy has tended to ignore or at least skirt the issue
of the relationship of the individual to the group (for example, the
relation of the judge to the court on which she sits). Philosophers
frequently seem to make one of three simplistic assumptions. Some
simply assume that all judges follow the same rules, at least to the
point at which they exhaust such rules.3 5 Others assume that each
judge has a personal way of reasoning, distinct and separate from
other judges.3 6 Still others attribute to judges (and all persons)
3" The pervasive theme of Wittgenstein's reflections on philosophy, understand-
ing, and language is arguably the notion that all understanding and language use
depend on pre-existing practices within the community of language-users and fellow-
reasoners. Thus, Wittgenstein does not give as much attention to what individualizes
one reasoner from another as I shall do in this article. My main point is that the
individual does not create or initiate ex nihilo strategies of understanding and
reasoning. Rather, she derives the ingredients from the pre-existing strategies of
others and melds and modifies them in her own experience.
3' This expresses the point of view of most positivists. Neil MacCormick
summarizes H.L.A. Hart's position on decision-making as follows:
Hart does indeed affirm that law essentially comprises rules. He further
affirms that a great part of legal business consists in the straightforward and
uncontroversial application, observance and enforcement of rules. But he
accepts, in partial agreement with the realists, that rules cannot settle
everything. Being framed in language, rules are "open-textured" and often
vague.... So Hart concludes that within the framework of rules whose
meaning is clear enough for some purposes, there is and must be a
considerable range of discretion left open to judges and other officials.
NEIL MACCoRMIcK, H.L.A. HART 26 (1981) (emphasis omitted).
3 Dworkin summarizes his best understanding ofjudicial decision-making when
he says that
[1law as integrity ... requires ajudge to test his interpretation of any part
of the great network of political structures and decisions of his community
by asking whether it could form part of a coherent theory justifying the
network as a whole.
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certain distinctive ways of reasoning characteristic of persons of
their gender, their social class, or their race.- 7 Viewing law as a
deliberative practice allows us to relate the strategies of reasoning
of judges, and individuals in general, to groups in a more interest-
ing and illuminating way, one that compels us to rethink the nature
of legal reasoning.
A. Rules, Games, and Judgments
1. The Hardest Question: A Tale of Two Metaphors
I begin by making clear the generality of the philosophical
problem of explaining agreement and disagreement and using the
idea of a deliberative practice to show that the hardest question, the
central question, in philosophy is the coexistence of agreement and
disagreement in all discourse.
This question is so familiar and general an expression of
philosophical perplexity throughout its history that some may see it
as banal. The possibility of philosophical analysis, or any kind of
analysis or communication, is grounded on the commonality of what
we think and what we say about experience and language. Whether
the example of philosophical analysis is Plato on the good, Kant on
understanding, or Rawls on justice,3 8 philosophical investigation
is possible only if it refers to common experiences expressible in a
common language.
3 9
[The judge's] answer will depend on his convictions about the two
constituent virtues of political morality we have considered: justice and
fairness.
RONALD DWORKIN, LAW's EMPIRE 245, 249 (1986).
37 Critical legal theorists emphasize this kind of relativity among judges.
[Judges'] particular backgrounds, socialization, and experiences.., result
in a patterning, a consistency, in the ways they categorize, approach, and
resolve social and political conflicts. This is a great source of the law's
power: It reinforces, reflects, constitutes, and legitimizes dominant social
and power relations without a need for or the appearance of control from
outside.
David Kairys, Introduction, in THE POLrIcs OF LAW 1, 5 (David Kairys ed., rev. ed.
1990).
38 See IMMANUEL KANT, THE CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON (F. Max Mfiller trans.,
1966); PLATO, THE REPUBLIC (Raymond Larson trans. & ed. 1979); JOHN RAWLS, A
THEORY OFJUSTICE (1971).
39 For a discussion of the central role of the self-conscious examination of
language in the philosophy of the last fifty years, see THE LINGUISTIC TURN (Richard
Rorty ed., 1967); IAN HACKING, WHY DOES LANGUAGE MATTER TO PHILOSOPHY?
(1975).
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At the same time, these matters-the nature of the good, or
understanding, or justice-are never settled once and for all. Let's
assume this is not because Plato or Rawls is a second-rate thinker
but because deep-seated disagreement as well as agreement is
characteristic of the understanding of experience. Persons, whether
philosophers or not, are bound to disagree about the good or truth
or justice as much as they agree. And the framework of agreement
gives structure to the process of disagreeing. We argue about the
good or justice and give reasons to persuade others to change their
minds. Sometimes, perhaps often, persuasion fails and the
arguments break down. Sometimes, perhaps often, the arguments
barely get off the ground because the disagreements are profound.
But sometimes they succeed. 40 Although this all too familiar
situation of agreeing and disagreeing is characteristic of all
discourse, philosophy represents it in its most self-conscious form.
It is so familiar that it defies easy analysis.
a. Centripetal and Centrifugal Reasoning
One useful metaphor for representing such agreement and
disagreement is the distinction between centrifugal and centripetal
forces. A centripetal force draws disparate elements to a common
center or axis; a centrifugal force scatters elements by driving them
away from a common center or axis. The pervasive emphasis of
philosophical discourse has been centripetal. Recent philosophy
seeks to clarify shared structures of experience and the shared
language in which experience is expressed. It draws attention to a
common center, clarifies the common conceptual scheme within
which disparate experiences and interpretations of experience
occur. To the extent that antifoundationalists question the
possibility of a common center and assert that shared values, shared
concepts, and a common language are illusory, their impact is
centrifugal and therefore subversive.
41
40 Other things being equal, a theory that recognizes and explains the common
experience of persuasion is superior to one that denies or ignores the experience.
41 To say that a theory is subversive is not necessarily criticism (nor is it
necessarily praise). The aim of a theory, on my view, is to describe the centrifugal-
centripetal mix of forces correctly-or, to speak nonmetaphorically, to describe the
causes of and constraints on agreement and disagreement.
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b. The Metaphor of Games
The centripetal-centrifugal force metaphor is a process meta-
phor about moving toward or away from agreement. The second
metaphor, the metaphor of games, is structural. It concerns the
domain of tacit agreement that makes possible a realm of disagree-
ing discourse, of argument. The metaphor of games, or more
specifically that of playing a game by rules, takes us closer to what
is puzzling about agreement and disagreement.
Modern thinkers point out that common beliefs about experi-
ence and common practice in the use of language provide the
context in which we form opinions, engage in discourse, interpret
experience, agree and disagree. 42 These common beliefs look like
the rules of a game and our individual judgments/arguments seem
comparable to the moves of players. Just as touchdowns and home
runs are possible only because the shared rules of football and
baseball are taken for granted, so too debates about esthetics or
politics or morality appear possible only because we have a shared
understanding of the range of mutually understandable positions
and of the kinds of moves (of reasons) that count as possible
justificatory moves in discourse. 43 Moreover, just as with games,
our shared participation in such discourse seems to rest on the fact
that we have similar physical capacities, emotions, thought patterns,
and linguistic capacities.
4 4
The impulse to illuminate the acquisition of knowledge and
making of judgments by appeal to the idea of games with rules is
seductive. For example, Thomas Kuhn's influential attempt to
distinguish normal science from scientific revolutions rests on the
42 This kind of observation leads philosophers like Wittgenstein and those
influenced by him to speak about pervasive language-games. See WrrrGENSTEIN, supra
note 1, at 2-15.
43 Perhaps the most influential attempt to use the metaphor of games explicitly
is in the early articles ofJohn Rawls. See, e.g.,John Rawls, Two Concepts of Rules, 64
PHIL. REv. 3 (1955). For Hart's use of the game metaphor, see HART, supra note 21,
at 138-44.
44 Wittgenstein makes a similar point, focusing not on similarities in physical and
psychological endowment but rather on the beliefs that must be shared and taken for
granted for linguistic transactions-indeed, for any investigating or questioning or
judging-to occur:
343. But it isn't that the situation is like this: We just can't investigate
everything, and for that reason we are forced to rest content with as-
sumption. If I want the door to turn, the hinges must stay put.
344. My 1ife consists in my being content to accept many things.
WrrGENSTEIN, supra note 1, at 44.
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claim that normal scientific research is pursued by investigators who
agree on research procedures, standards of proof, and basic
assumptions about what is to be investigated.45 They are able to
carry on moves within the practice of scientific research because
they play by the same rules. By contrast, a scientific revolution
occurs when the rules themselves need to be changed.
The metaphorical use of the concept of a game quickly gives rise
to difficulty. Is there a clear way to distinguish moves from rules?
In true games, one has little trouble telling the rules from the
individual moves and strategies of players. The rules of chess or
baseball are uncontroversial and uncontroverted by players; they are
constitutive 46 and define what counts as scoring, as winning and
losing, and as a move. The rules are what one must learn to
become a participant. On the other hand, in discourse, in discus-
sions of justice for example, the relation between what is assumed
and what is controverted and arguable is itself unstable. In fact, the
voluminous philosophical literature on justice shows fundamental
disagreement about what the constitutive rules are for the "game"
of making judgments about justice.
c. Applying the Game Metaphor to Law
How can one distinguish the rules for discussing the nature of
justice from moves within the game? The fact that debates among
judges are intelligible to the participants and all who read opinions
implies that in some sense the participants are engaged in a shared
practice and therefore are playing by the same rules. But what are
the rules for deciding hard cases of law as opposed to moves made
by judges in legal argument? Attempting to identify the rules of the
45 See THOMAS S. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REvoLUTIONS (2
International Encyclopedia of Unified Science, 2d ed. 1970).
46 Rawls defines constitutive rules as follows:
[T]he rules of practices are logically prior to particular cases. This is so
because there cannot be a particular case of an action falling under a rule
of a practice unless there is the practice....
One may illustrate this point from the game of baseball. Many of the
actions one performs in a game of baseball one can do by oneself or with
others whether there is the game or not. For example, one can throw a ball,
run, or swing a peculiarly shaped piece of wood. But one cannot steal a
base, or strike out, or draw a walk, or make an error, or balk.... Striking
out, stealing a base, balking, etc., are all actions which can only happen in
a game .... The practice is logically prior to particular cases: unless there
is the practice the terms referring to actions specified by it lack a sense.
Rawls, supra note 43, at 25.
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shared practice is Sisyphean. Such writers as Rawls and Dworkin
distinguish formally between concepts and conceptions, implying
that those who agree about concepts are playing by the same rules
and that disagreements about conceptions are moves within the
practice.
4 7
This attempt to sort out moves from rules produces four distinct
kinds of theoretical responses, based respectively on liberal
consensus theory and on the moral, conceptual, and semantic
arguments of antifoundationalists. Liberal theorists such as Ronald
Dworkin and Owen Fiss try to justify a deep consensus about
justice.48 They seek to settle disagreement by showing that the
shared rules of the game, properly understood, yield clear answers
to most legal controversies. Antifoundational theorists, by contrast,
subvert such efforts by showing that disagreement is well grounded
in irreconcilable and partial ways of understanding and describing
experience.
This distiriction between consensus and antifoundational
theorists allows us to bring the two metaphors together. The
consensus theorist offers a complex account of the rules of the
game in an attempt to show that disagreement is largely a matter of
misunderstanding the rules and that there is a conceptual and moral
core to our practices that need only be elucidated. Consensus
theorists thus exemplify the centripetal process of theorizing. By
contrast, antifoundational theorists seek to offer an account that
undercuts the possibility of resolving disagreement by shared
conceptual and moral understandings. The impulses of the
antifoundationalists are centrifugal. 49 This is well illustrated by
47 "[I]t seems natural to think of the concept ofjustice as distinct from the various
conceptions ofjustice and as being specified by the role which these different sets of
principles, these different conceptions, have in common." RAWLS, supra note 38, at
5.
"I might say that I meant the family to be guided by the concept of fairness, not
by any specific conception of fairness I might have had in mind. This is a crucial
distinction which it is worth pausing to explore." RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTs
SERIOUSLY 134 (1977).
48 See id.; DWORKIN, supra note 36; Owen M. Fiss, Objectivity and Interpretation, 34
STAN. L. REv. 739 (1982). Both writers exemplify what I have called the centripetal
force of consensus theory.
"9 It is important to note a sense in which the contrast between centrifugal and
centripetal tendencies in theorizing oversimplifies the range of views on constitutional
interpretation. Both Dworkin and critical theorists such as Duncan Kennedy
emphasize the individuality ofjudging. Neither liberals nor their critics deny that
judges reason in ways that reflect personal style, personal history, etc. All, in this
sense, have learned some of the lessons of legal realism. But for liberals, the judge
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their approaches to constitutional interpretation.
2. Judicial Interpretation
The questions of how and why our efforts at understanding
human experience yield agreement and disagreement are especially
acute in law. Law involves the deliberate manipulation of some of
the most important circumstances of life. Critical theory is surely
correct in its claim that law is not just a product of our decisions
but is constitutive of consciousness.
Why has judicial decision-making long been the main focus of
jurisprudential discussion on the limits and processes of law 5 0
First, the received wisdom holds that judges are constrained by law
in deciding cases, constrained by legal rather than political, moral,
or prudential concerns. The limits of law are, so the theory goes,
the limits of what is relevant in decision-making. Second, the
traditional account says that hard cases are those in which judges
run up against the limits of law, either because the law doesn't
speak to these issues or because it speaks in ways that conflict
sharply with other reasons for decision. The process of deciding
such cases makes evident the relationship of legal and other
justifications. Finally, because the Constitution trumps other law
and presents the most intractable problems of interpretation,
constitutional interpretation fills the spotlight. It does so whether
theorists aim to carry out or to debunk this familiar jurisprudential
agenda.
Approaches to constitutional interpretation illustrate well the
conflict between centripetal and centrifugal theorizing. Consensus
theory exemplifies centripetal theorizing while the three distinct
moves of antifoundationalists-skepticism about value, conceptual
relativity, and stability in meaning-represent centrifugal theorizing.
is nonetheless an exemplar of the interests of law and of the community through law,
an exemplar that is capable of transcending the partial interests of a subgroup as
reflected in a way of thinking that reflects domination of one subgroup by another.
Critical writers question the possibility of such transcendence.
So Introductory essays by Dworkin and Tushnet illustrate the tendencies of
theorists to identify questions of the bounds and nature of law with questions about
the role ofjudges. See RONALD DWORKIN, A MATrER OF PRINCIPLE 9-32 (1985); MARK
TUSHNET, RED, WHITE, AND BLUE: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
1-17 (1988).
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a. Consensus Theory
The trajectory traced by the relevant recent writings on
constitutional interpretation 51 is deceptively simple. The ex-
pressed goal of many writers is a criterion for proper decision-
making. Such theorists argue that a criterion is needed to constrain
judicial license and to validate criticism of judicial reasoning.
Accordingly, some argue that a correct understanding of judicial
interpretation (of the rules of the practice) requires adherence to
the intentions of the founders. 52 Others try to show that interpre-
tation is governed by "disciplining rules" that assure judicial
objectivity. 53  Still others describe a method for arriving at the
"best interpretation" of tacit principles embodied in our constitu-
tional legacy.54 The underlying assumption in each case is that the
rules of the practice are capable of constraining judicial discretion
and thus fostering a neutral, objective, or integrative approach to
decision-making.
b. Antifoundationalism
Antifoundational skeptics reject this consensus position, arguing
that the rhetoric of neutral rules obscures our understanding of a
process that is altogether political. Accordingly, these theorists
subvert the idea of objective rules by attacking assumptions about
shared social values, individual impartiality, and fixed textual
51 By "recent" I refer to the avalanche of writings since 1970 in constitutional
theory. This includes, in the first generation of writers, the work ofRonald Dworkin,
John Hart Ely, Michael Perry, Paul Brest, Laurence Tribe, Owen Fiss, and Richard
Kay. These writers defend particular approaches to decision-making as constraints
upon judicial license and as explicating the true meaning of constitutionalism. The
range of approaches represented by these writers is wide, from original intent to
various kinds of liberalism. In the 1980s, the flowering of critical theory in the work
of many writers, including Mark Tushnet, Sanford Levinson, Catharine MacKinnon,
Duncan Kennedy, Robert Gordon, Robin West,Joseph Singer, and Roberto Unger,
represents a retreat from the claim thatjudicial decision-makingis indeed constrained
and that the idea of constitutionalism is rich enough to embrace principles reflecting
the shared interests of all.
52 Raoul Berger is probably the most prolific theorist defending original intent.
See RAOUL BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY: THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT (1977). A recent and eloquent defense of original intent
theory is Richard S. Kay, Adherence to the Original Intentions in Constitutional
Adjudication, 82 Nw. U. L. REV. 226 (1988).
53 See Fiss, supra note 48, at 744-50.
54 See DWORKIN, supra note 36, at 225-75. For a succinct statement of Dworkin's
position, see Ronald A. Dworkin, "Natural"Law Revisited, 34 U. FLA. L. REV. 165, 166-
73 (1982) [hereinafter Dworkin, Natural].
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meaning.
While all of these antifoundational arguments have centrifugal
impact, their scope and implications vary. The moral argument of
these critics tracks what many see as common sense: the view that
judges have and follow political agendas. The spectrum of political
agendas embraces on the political left egalitarian and redistributive
processes and goals, and on the right laissez-faire and libertarian
ones. A particular judge may have a complex agenda, taking left-
leaning positions on some issues and right-leaning ones on
others.55 She may even be torn by conflicting approaches to a
particular issue. The spectrum of political agendas is often
described in terms of competing conceptions of liberalism, from a
welfare state model with a broadly redistributive agenda to a laissez-
faire model of minimal state intervention.
The conceptual argument maintains that partiality is unavoid-
able not only in social values but also in conceptual capacities.
Thus, it impeaches the basis of liberalism, the idea of government
as a neutral and non-interfering arbiter among persons with
different schemes of preference. The argument says that non-
interference in preference formation is an illusion because persons
do not form preferences independently of the institutional and
educative context that makes the existence of preferences and
choice possible.5 6 Moreover, any such context embodies relation-
ships of power and assumptions about value that shape the
conceptual categories and language in which preferences are
understood, expressed, and acted upon.
Accordingly, the conceptual argument continues, a communitar-
ian description of the role of government and law must replace
liberal assumptions. Communitarian theorists make disparate
claims. One is that we must recreate a vanished or hypothesized
time of shared social values, a time of consensus about the rules of
the practice. A second claim is that one must seek to transcend the
conceptual partiality induced by the social and institutional context
that defines one's personal history.57 In embracing deconstructive
" In contrast to this man-on-the-street description of judges as creatures of
politics, Duncan Kennedy offers an attempt to characterize judging "from the inside."
See Duncan Kennedy, Freedom and Constraint in Adjudication: A Critical Phenomenology,
36J. LEGAL EDUC. 518 (1986).
5 See MAcKINNON, supra note 3, at 121-25; Gordon, supra note 3, at 102-13; West,
supra note 2, at 81-90.
57 Not all critical theorists who maintain the conceptual relativism argument end
up advocating communitarianism. Nonetheless, the theme is widely supported and
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semantic or linguistic arguments, recent constitutional theory offers
a third kind of antifoundational (or centrifugal) gesture in addition
to the moral arguments against any possible consensus of social
values within liberalism, and to the conceptual arguments against
liberalism itself as neutrality. This third attack questions whether
texts themselves-in expressing rules, goals, and values-have
determinate meaning.58 If constancy of meaning across different
hearers/interpreters is an illusion, then any shared understanding
of rules is adventitious and unreliable.
The three antifoundational arguments erode the foundations of
the metaphor of games. The moral attack on a liberal consensus
theory maintains that the shared rules by which judges judge do not
produce common answers to hard questions. The rules are at best
rules of language and meaning by which judges recognize one
another's justifications. The conceptual attack on liberalism as
neutrality maintains that different subcommunities play by different
rules with differing commitments, and that shared rules of language
and meaning mask rather than bridge diversity. Finally, the
semantic attack on language and determinate meaning concludes
that reliance on any determinate rules is itself an illusion. Thus at
each level the metaphor of a game as a practice with shared rules
erodes further, eventually to the vanishing point.
discussed by critical legal theorists and feminists. See TUSHNET, supra note 50;
Symposium, The Republican Civic Tradition, 97 YALE L.J. 1493, 1493-1723 (1988);Joan
C. Williams, Deconstructing Gender, 87 MICH. L. REV. 797, 836-43 (1989);.
58 Richard Kay summarizes this view in stating that
[some] critics emphasize that variability of meaning is a necessary conse-
quence of the multiplicity of readers. Every act of interpretation is a shared
enterprise between the text (and its author) and the reader. The conse-
quences of that enterprise depend not only on what the text contains but
on the outlook, expectations, and preconceptions of the reader. Interpreta-
tion must, therefore, vary from reader to reader, from era to era or from
group to group.
Kay, supra note 52, at 237-38 (footnote omitted). See also FISH, TEXT, supra note 19,
at 1-17 (tracing Fish's theoretical shift from the view that the text provides meaning
and constrains interpretation to the theory that the text is a product of interpreta-
tion); id. at 97-111 (arguing that "literature" is not a formal set of criteria but rather
is "made" by a community of readers). Writers align themselves on a spectrum
according to their views about the degree of constraint imposed by the text, the
reader's community, etc., as opposed to the degree of freedom and indeterminateness
in reading. Gadamer and Fish both discuss the constraining impact of interpretive
communities. See HANS-GEORG GADAMER, TRUTH AND METHOD 267-72 (1975). For
a critique of "nihilistic" versions of this relativist thesis, see Dennis M. Patterson,
Interpretation in Law-Toward a Reconstruction of the Current Debate, 29 VILL. L. REV.
671, 680-82 (1984).
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c. Implications for Theory and Practice
Consensus (centripetal) theorists who claim to find determinate
constraints on judges by identifying original intent or evolving
shared values take the point of view of enlightened participants of
the practice and highlight the insider's understanding of the rules.
As a result, they meld recommendations for the resolution of hard
cases with theoretical analysis and commend particular justificatory
schemes and outcomes to judges.59 By contrast, antifoundational
(skeptical, centrifugal, deconstructive) theorists tend to take the
perspective of outsiders to the practices they criticize.60  For
example, they attempt to explain why the idea of a consensus is
illusory.
Accordingly, moral skeptics, who question the availability of
shared values, conclude that the rules of the practice (like those of
many true games) insure that players will use competing strategies
and have irreconcilable aims.61 Skeptics who stress the partiality
of any conceptual framework speak from the point of view of
outsiders and assert a conceptual gulf between the points of view of
theorist and participant: the participant, as insider, is trapped
within a perspective and constitutes reality from that perspective
while the theorist, as outsider, characterizes all participant-perspec-
tives as equally partial, and in this sense claims to transcend them.
An even greater gulf exists between the linguistic skeptic, who
claims that texts and utterances in general have no determinate
meaning, and the participant, whose activity presumes that words
communicate and justify decisions.
62
The difficulties that any theory has in coming to terms with the
relationship of participant and theorist reflect the complex, Janus-
59 Dworkin, for example, argues that implicit in his theoretical analysis are ways
of resolving hard questions about abortion, free speech, affirmative action, and civil
disobedience. See DWORKIN, supra note 50, at 104-16 (civil disobedience), 293-331
(affirmative action), 335-97 (censorship, pornography, and freedom of the press);
DWORKIN, supra notes 47, at 123-30 (abortion), 206-22 (civil disobedience), 22339
(reverse discrimination).
60 This stance is complicated by the fact that antifoundationalists paradoxically
argue that there "is no outside." This is an instance of the skeptical paradox so well
described by Strawson. See infra note 68.
61 The extent to which this is true in a given community at a given time will vary
with the issue and with the range of positions on the issue. There generally will be
harmony on some issues.
62 The extent of the gulf depends, of course, on the relative degree of constraint
the theorist is willing to concede to continuity of meaning over time, to stability of
meaning within a community, etc. See supra note 58 and accompanying text.
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like role of judges as appliers of rules and interpreters/creators of
rules. If judging is like a game, what role-that of rule-maker,
umpire, or player-is performed by the judge? In true games, the
distinction between participant and non-participant follows
immediately from the rules. Theoretical discourse about the rules
themselves, rather than about moves that apply the rules, is the
activity of outsiders and not of participants. The fact that judges,
who are obviously participants, engage in discourse about the rules
and in applying the rules complicates the distinction between
participant and theorist and underscores how problematic the
metaphor of games is in this context.
63
3. Critique
Each theoretical position on judicial interpretation is open to
the criticism that it is counterintuitive. Do consensus theorists
imagine that an analysis of the constraints on judging can make
hard cases easy and displace disagreements that have survived as
long as courts have existed? Such assurance has been and remains
a jurisprudential sitting duck.6 4 On the other hand, the moral
skeptic's tendency to sort out conflicting positions along a familiar
political spectrum 65 seems to belie the complexity and diversity of
judicial reasoning. The conceptual skeptic's implication that each
judge is cocooned within a conceptual scheme, one that presumes
unquestioningly a particular allocation of power, entails despair ab
63 See supra text accompanying note 46; cf. supra note 21 and text accompanying
notes 21-24 (discussing the implications of adopting so-called internal or external
points of view).
6 For an acute critique of Dworkin's theory, see David C. Hoy, Dworkin's
Constructive Optimism v. Deconstructive Legal Nihilism, 6 LAW & PHIL. 321 (1987). See
also Larry Alexander, Striking Back at The Empire: A Brief Survey of Problems in
Dworkin's Theory of Law, 6 LAw & PHIL. 419 (1987); Stanley Fish, Still Wrong After All
These Years, 6 LAw & PHIL. 401 (1987).
65 Kennedy claims that "there are two opposed rhetorical modes for dealing with
substantive issues .... individualism and altruism." Duncan Kennedy, Form and
Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1685, 1685 (1976). Kennedy's
description of the two modes fits some conceptions of the political spectrum defined
by "right" and "left." In this sense, classic liberalism is individualistic and right-wing,
whereas modern liberalism is collectivistic. My argument implicitly challenges
Kennedy's claim that this particular political dyad, or pair of alternatives, is
conceptually primitive. I claim that in addition to the metaphor of government as
neutral mediator and the metaphor of government as incorporator and nurturer of
value, other metaphors drawn from physics, psychology, history, etc., are equally
available and primitive. The range of available metaphors seems in principle
unlimited.
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initio toward the efforts ofjudges to reflect upon and effectively to
transcend such limits. Finally, judges and all who use language
presume in their actions that the linguistic skeptic is misguided and
that meaning is communicable.
Each of these theories can be criticized for assuming that what
can be said of some instances of judicial reasoning can be said for
all. Some consensus theorists assume that ifjudges are constrained
by history (original intent) in some cases, then history is equally
relevant in all. 6 Others argue that if there is a consensus of value,
then cases in general are to be resolved by appeal to it.67 If judges
are ever affected by conceptual bias, by non-neutrality, then they are
generally affected in this way. If language is indeterminate, if
communication is imperfect, it is generally imperfect. All four of
these presuppositions homogenize judicial reasoning. All for that
reason seem counterintuitive.68
My critique is sketchy and incomplete. It is intended not to
dismiss consensus and skeptical theories, but to situate them by
reference to their characterization of agreement and disagreement.
Consensus theory maintains that disagreement is in principle
eradicable. Skeptical theories hold that disagreement is deep and
enduring.69 All of the theories reach these conclusions by taking
66 See BERGER, supra note 52, at 363-72 (arguing that original intent should always
be used as an interpretive guide).
67 See, e.g., DWORKIN, supra note 36; DWORKIN, supra note 47; Fiss, supra note 48
(discussing the notion of an "interpretive community" as central to his argument on
the possibility of objective interpretation).
e8 Theorists often take a characteristic of some instances of reasoning and treat it
as a characteristic of all reasoning. Everyone can easily summon up instances of
values that are relative (variable across individuals), of concepts that reflect bias, of
indeterminate language, or of cases in which adherence to historical intent is
defensible. But universalizing these observations is not plausible. Not all values are
relative in the same way; some values reflect variable preferences while others reflect
universal needs. To call the latter "relative" is to remove the term from ordinary
usage, and thus not to speak unequivocally. Similarly, the policies of Amnesty
International do not reflect bias in the way that, for example, the policies of the State
of Mississippi in 1961 did. To say that all policies reflect the biases of the empowered
is, again, to give specialized meaning to "bias" and to use it equivocally. Some uses
of language give rise to perceptions of ambiguity and to puzzlement; others do not.
To say that both are "indeterminate" is to use the term equivocally, employing its
ordinary usage in the first instance but not in the second. Cf P.F. STRAWSON,
INDIVIDUALS: AN ESSAY IN DESCRIPTIVE METAPHYsICS 106 (1959) ("So with many
skeptical problems: their statement involves the pretended acceptance of a
conceptual scheme and at the same time the silent repudiation of one of the
conditions of its existence. That is why they are, in the terms in which they are
stated, insoluble.")
69This view is also commonplace among political scientists. The special
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shortcuts, by assuming that certain generalizations about legal
justification hold universally. Before devising a more complete
critique of these theories, I shall offer an account of judicial
agreement and disagreement that explains them in terms of the
heterogeneity ofjustificatory strategies.
B. Practices and Deliberative Practices
To understand how consensus theorists and skeptics alike
overlook essential features of legal reasoning and buy theoretical
clarity at the cost Of misdescription, we need to look at the
heterogeneous character of legal justification and the scope of
justificatory patterns that judges use to explain judgments. Doing
so requires us to examine the more general idea of a practice and
the narrower idea of a deliberative practice before applying the
concept of a deliberative practice to judicial reasoning.
1. Practices in General
The concept of a practice is among the most useful (and
controversial) tools of twentieth-century philosophy. 70 An intuitive
look at -practices may begin with such nonlinguistic activities as
driving or swimming. In each case, persons acquire skills or ways
of proceeding that become habitual and unreflective. When we call
such skills "second nature," we mean that, though they are socially
and culturally grounded, such ways of proceeding become as much
a part of us as our genetic endowment.
71
contribution of critical theory is to give this assumption a conceptual or epistemo-
logical character-in reaction to the common disregard of questions ofepistemological
relativism in debates between positivists and naturalists. So long as the main concern
of theory was the nature of law and so long as that issue was not reduced to the
nature of resources for judging, epistemology was not of immediate concern. Once
judges took center stage, epistemological questions could no longer be avoided.
0 The conception of philosophy as the examination of practices, preeminently
linguistic practices, has come under sustained attack. For one of the earliest sets of
critical articles, see CLARITY Is NOT ENOUGH: ESSAYS IN CRITICISM OF LINGUISTIC
PHILOSOPHY (H.D. Lewis ed., 1963); cf ESSAYS ON MORAL REALISM (Geoffrey Sayre-
McCord ed., 1988) (providing a moral realist view at odds with the practice
conception, treating it as a form of conventionalism); REDRAWING THE LINES:
ANALYTIC PHILOSOPHY, DECONSTRUCTION, AND LITERARY THEORY (Reed W.
Dasenbrock ed., 1989) (examining the implications of the practice conception in
reference to contemporary theories).
71 One might distinguish swimming from driving by arguing that acts involving
survival and locomotion in water are, to some extent, natural and spontaneous-
although they are not universal and although particular strokes must be learned.
Driving, on the other hand, is wholly an adaptation to technology and in no sense is
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A habitual repertoire has distinctive features and distinctive ways
of perceiving, feeling, and acting. A good driver makes judgments
about road conditions and the disposition of other drivers,
apprehends dangers, and acts accordingly. What she does unreflect-
ingly can, however, be made conscious. 72 Ordinarily, doing so is
neither necessary nor appropriate.
A characterization of what is involved in having such a skill, in
being a good driver, is at once descriptive and normative. The
characteristics of a driver (in general) are distinguished only in
degree from the characteristics of a good driver. To be able to
identify driving is also to be able to tell good driving. Both
thresholds are inherently vague. No clear and simple criterion
distinguishes those who cannot drive from those who do so very
badly.73 Similarly, not everyone will agree on the marks of very
good driving. But the range of understandable disagreement is low.
2. Linguistic Practices
Some of our practices are primarily communicative (as driving
obviously is not). And some of our communicative practices, by far
the most important ones, are linguistic. Wittgenstein attends to
such aspects of language as color-descriptions and expressions of
pain. Just as driving is a skill that individuals acquire because a
public practice, a shared activity, already exists, so too perceptions
of color and distinctions among kinds of pain manifest the acquired
skills of those who have been initiated into certain practices.
74
Persons identify colors and pains to the extent that a place exists for
the repertoire of the behavior natural or spontaneous. Psychologists might regard
all these observations as trivially true. Among some philosophers before Witt-
genstein, such as Locke and Hume, the notion that the capacity to recognize objects
and name them was natural and spontaneous, rather than part of a socially learned
repertoire, was a basic tenet of epistemology. See 1 DAVID HUME, A TREATISE OF
HUMAN NATURE 1-25 (1890, orig. 1739); 2 JOHN LOCKE, AN ESSAY, CONCERNING
HUMAN UNDERSTANDING 3-164 (Alexander C. Fraser ed., 1959) (1690). For
Wittgenstein's criticisms of the natural and spontaneous capacity theory, see
WITTGENSTEIN, supra note 22, at 2-10.
72 Perhaps unconscious repertoires of behavior cannot be made completely
conscious. Consider the way one conveys attitude by facial expression, intonation,
etc. Self-scrutiny can discover some dimensions of the repertoire but probably not
all.
73 See THOMAS MORAWETz, THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 11-16 (1980) (noting as an
illustrative example the conceptual difficulties in defining a knife).
74 See WITTGENSTEIN, supra note 22, at 88-93, 95-104; see also LUDWIG WTrGEN-
STEIN, REMARKS ON COLOUR (G.E.M. Anscombe ed., Linda L. McAlister & Margarete
Sch~ttle trans., 1977).
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the recognition of color and the expression of pain in the relevant
practices of a culture.
75
3. Deliberative Practices
These considerations about practices in general and about
simple linguistic practices in particular have implications for more
complex practices involving deliberation. A deliberative practice
consists of discourse directed toward forming and defending
judgments. Examples of deliberative practices are esthetic debate,
moral reasoning, discussions about history, and judicial decision-
making. The subject may be whether an object is beautiful, or
whether an action is right, or whether an event is a turning point in
history, or whether a plaintiff has a right to a favorable judgment.
All such debates have certain features in common. All involve
widely shared activities and/or institutions in civilized societies. All
involve abstract questions that have preoccupied persons through-
out history and seem intractable.
a. Understanding Disagreement
All practices allow the possibility, indeed the inevitability, of
idiosyncracy within shared ways of proceeding. Even though
persons share a sense of what driving is, each driver has a personal
style. Similarly, each of us has a distinctive way of using color
language: I may tend not to discriminate among various shades of
red; one friend may sharply distinguish scarlet and crimson; another
friend may use these two terms in a distinctively different way.
76
In deliberative activities, this diversity within shared mutually
understood ways of proceeding is especially significant. No two
persons have the same history or have the same dispositions. Some
are more credulous than others, more perceptive, more doubting,
more impulsive; some are better versed in history, some in physics,
75 Some philosophers have seen this suggestion as revolutionary and counter-
intuitive. The philosophical assumption of most empiricists has been that the domain
of private experience is fully configured and that the public arena of language is
merely a set of conventions and labels attached to the distinct elements of private
experience. But Wittgenstein challenges this assumption. He asks us to reflect on
what it could be like to experience a color for which a place was not already prepared
in the experiential realm shared with others.
76 Ordinarily, the shared practice offers all of us means for discovering and
sorting out our divergent ways of proceeding in those relatively rare cases in which
it matters to do so. To that extent, variation exists and is discoverable within a
shared context.
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some in psychology; and some are generally ignorant. Much more
importantly, each has a characteristic way of reasoning that
represents an interpretive orientation to the world, a way of making
sense of the phenomena of experience by giving order to the many
domains of knowledge and opinion in which she or he participates.
Consider the diversity of reasons given to justify and explain
esthetic judgments. One person may offer psychological grounds
for finding something beautiful. Another may refer to inherent
properties of the object itself. Yet another may look to the ways in
which the object expresses the intentions of the artist and to the
quality of those intentions. A fourth may appeal to the social and
political function of the object in assessing esthetic worth.
77
Other deliberative practices can be broken down in a similar
manner. One historian will use the influence of ideas as the
explanans that unlocks historical change; another will look to
economic motives and events; still another will stress the charismatic
influence of leaders.7 8  In moral discourse, one theorist will see
altruistic utilitarianism as offering the most coherent account of
moral judgment; another will see psychologistic or hedonistic
utilitarianism as basic; a third will argue that moral reasoning is
essentially deontological.
79
b. Agreement and the Bounds of Practice
It is as important to see what draws participants in deliberative
practices together as to see what separates them. Even when they
disagree, participants recognize and understand each others'
argumentative strategies. They share a sense of what reasons are
relevant to the common discourse. Discussing beauty, they may
77 For a recent collection of articles on various esthetic theories, including
cognitivism, representationalism and expressionism, see MODERNISM, CRITICISM,
REALISM (Charles Harrison & Fred Orton eds., 1984).
78 See PATRICK GARDINER, THE NATURE OF HISTORICAL EXPLANATION 65-112
(1952) (examining historians' method of explaining events); see generally SIDNEY
HOOK, THE HERO IN HISTORY (1943) (arguing that historical events are primarily the
product of extraordinary individuals).
79 For recent and thought-provoking discussions of metaethical questions, see
THOMAS NAGEL, THE VIEW FROM NOWHERE 164-88 (1986) (analyzing reasons for
departing from the general goal of objective ethical criteria); BERNARD WILLIAMS,
ETHICS AND THE LIMITS OF PHILOSOPHY 30-93 (1985) (evaluating the contribution of
philosophy to coherence in ethical reasoning); see also C.D. BROAD, FIVE TYPES OF
ETHICAL THEORY (1934) (explaining and criticizing the ethical theories of Spinoza,
Butler, Hume, Kant, and Sidgwick); ALASDAIR MACINTYRE, WHOSEJUSTICE? WHICH
RATIONALITY? (1988) (arguing for the possibility of cross-cultural rationality in ethics).
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consider symmetry and asymmetry, balance and imbalance,
representational aspects of the object, context, or purpose. They
will not consider relevant whether the artist had a short life,
whether her name began with a vowel, or whether the object or
performance is privately financed. These observations may seem
obvious, but only because they are so familiar, only because they are
"second nature." Each participant can generally anticipate the
moves that others will make.80 The practice consists in the recogni-
tion of a family of reasoning strategies that allow for a spectrum of
judgments.
Thus, it is not the case that anything counts. Just as in driving
or in identifying colors, the publicly shared understanding of what
moves are comprehensible ways of proceeding circumscribes the
practice and makes it possible. To try to imagine a practice in
which any act by someone sitting in a driver's seat counts as driving
or a practice in which any use of a color word is meaningful is to
imagine the impossible.
In deliberative practices, each participant will to some extent
take account of the reasons offered by others by trying to accomo-
date them within her own favored strategy.81 The utilitarian will
generally have considered and, to her satisfaction, explained away
80 It seems to me this is what Wittgenstein had in mind when he said:
80. The truth of my statements is the test of my understanding of these
statements.
81. That is to say: if I make certain false statements, it becomes uncertain
whether I understand them.
83. The truth of certain empirical propositions belongs to our frame of
reference.
149. Myjudgments themselves characterize the way I judge, characterize
the nature ofjudgment.
WrITGENSTEIN, supra note 1, at 12e, 22e. Wittgenstein's insight seems to be that any
practice allows certainjustificatory moves and not others, and that such other moves
are necessarily unintelligible and mark those who make them as nonparticipants,
mark their comments as nonsense. This is true of all language-games, true of all
discourse: every language-game is comprised of generally understood rules of
relevance. Intelligibility of any kind of discourse depends on shared conceptions of
relevance and irrelevance. Those who offer irrelevant evidence,justification, etc., are
speaking nonsense as far as the shared practice goes.
81 This is not to say that one participant may not simply be dismissive of others.
But the justifications offered by that participant are defective or incomplete unless
she can take account of others' reasons either by showing why her way of deciding
is superior or by modifying her way of deciding to accommodate and assimilate what
she finds valuable in the alternatives.
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non-utilitarian strategies and will have a favored account of their
appeal; the non-utilitarian will approach the utilitarian in the same
way. The person who gives psychological explanations for economic
phenomena will have ways of accounting for and rejecting the
opposite approach, and vice versa. Judges who find an evolving
consensus of values can explain why others find a different
consensus or none at all, and can argue why the others are wrong.
Thus, an essential part of each participant's way of proceeding will
be a strategy for incorporating or dismissing the favored strategies
of others. And each in turn will recognize and anticipate such
moves as part of the ongoing practice.
Equally essential to each participant's way of proceeding is the
recognition of her strategy's limitations. First, she will continually
encounter-and expect to encounter-new alternatives, new
strategies and new ways of thinking that she has not yet considered.
Second, she will appreciate that her strategy does not offer a
"transcendental" argument which subsumes the strategies of others
but one which is instead on a par with theirs: for each move she
makes to answer or accommodate others, these others can in
principle make a similar move. The expectation is of perpetual
dialogue, not final solutions.
c. Discourse and Debate
The diverse strategies that make up a deliberative practice
compete because there is no natural order of precedence among
categories of facts, among categories of reasons and justifications.
Categorical reduction can occur in many directions. For example,
some theorists explain political and economic phenomena by
reducing them to psychological patterns. Other theorists argue that
social experience is not reducible to individual psychological
categories and that economic phenomena are based on idealized
models and not psychology. The claim that all phenomena are
explainable through the hard sciences of physics and chemistry is
now widely rejected along with the supposed superiority of
microscopic to macroscopic explanations. 82  Reductionism in
aesthetics does not fare better. Appeals to the inherent features of
a work of art are neither more nor less basic a mode of justification
82 PETER WINCH, THE IDEA OF A SOCIAL SCIENCE: AND ITS RELATION TO
PHILOSOPHY 8-9 (1958) (arguing that scientific methods are not capable of answering
the philosophical question of "what is real?").
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(in esthetic reasoning) than appeals to the creator's intentions or to
the work's gestalt.
83
It is therefore up to the individual to choose among available
competing forms of explanation and to favor or reject reductionist
arguments. Convictions about relations among categories of
knowledge run deep. Try to shake the conviction of one who holds
that morality can "ultimately" be explained by chemical events in
the brain, or the conviction of someone who rejects this. Try to
dispel the reductionist approach of someone who favors a psycho-
logical account of, say, the attractions of fascism-or try to instill
such an approach in someone who thinks it is simplistic and
banal.8 4 In defending one's own judgment in a particular case,
one is also defending one's style ofjudgment, one's way of ordering
the data of experience to give some kinds precedence. The attempt
to convince others is not only an attempt to make them agree with
one's own conclusions but also an attempt to bring them around to
one's style of judgment.
8 5
d. Persuasion
The persuasive attempts of each participant are not, as one
might think, doomed. To say that each participant has a particular
way of proceeding in reasoning is not to say that she is condemned
to repeat the same moves forever. Individual participants differ not
only in judgments and in ways of reaching those judgments, but also
in their susceptibility to persuasion, and to considering and
adopting other points of view and other strategies. The practice
itself, as a collection of strategies mutually recognized by partici-
pants, evolves. Over time some strategies gain currency while
others go into temporary or permanent remission. Particular styles
of moral reasoning, of thinking about history, or of judging what
the appropriate role for government gain currency and then fade.
8 6
83 See supra text accompanying note 77.
4 A good example is the controversy that followed publication of HANNAH
ARENDT, EICHMANN INJERUSALEM: A REPORT ON THE BANALITY OF EVIL (1963). See
Hannah Arendt, Major Twentieth Century Writers, Aug. 1991, available in LEXIS,
Nexis Library, Allbio File (noting that Arendt's "subtle arguments provoked highly
emotional responses" among critics).
85 The impulse toward harmonizing or reconciling one's way of proceeding with
others' may be overridden by practical concerns. Ajudge will sometimes be content
for others to concur with her in result even if the result is reached on different
grounds.
86 For example, emotive approaches to morality, "great man" theories of historical
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C. Judicial Decision as a Deliberative Practice
The general description of deliberative practices highlights the
heterogeneity of the various strategies of reasoning that constitute
such practices. Deliberative practices encompass two kinds of
heterogeneity.
First there is heterogeneity within an individual's way of
proceeding. A given person will solve different problems in
different ways-with evidence drawn from whatever realms of
experience seem appropriate. A judge may draw on moral argu-
ments in some cases, historical or economic arguments in others.
8 7
Some judgments will reflect one's deepest convictions, while others
will reflect less fundamental beliefs.
Second, there is heterogeneity among those making judgments.
Each judgment-maker has her own idiosyncratic ways of ordering
experience within the mutually recognized bounds of what is
intelligible in the deliberative practice.
Legal theorists have not adequately taken into account the
complex nature of judicial decision-making. This is true of
consensus theorists as well as antifoundational skeptics. The latter's
references to value schemes and conceptual systems oversimplify
and exaggerate the sources and nature of disagreement by closeting
them into discrete value systems or conceptual frameworks.
88
Thus, theorists do not look deeply enough into the sources and
kinds of disagreement amongjudges. Certainly, theorists deal with
the brute fact thatjudges reach different results. Theorists also take
into account that judges who vote the same way may disagree in
influence, mechanistic explanations of behavior, and civil libertarian theories of
government all move on and off center stage. These theories may become prevailing
modes of thinking, reasoning, and justifying or they may be widely rejected.
87 To do so is not to be inconsistent. Such a judge may be fairly accused of
inconsistency only if she commits herself to inconsistent propositions or if she
chooses modes ofjustification arbitrarily, with no principled manner of selection.
Only a theoretical commitment to homogeneity would lead one to expect judges to
decide every case on historical grounds (original intent) or on economic grounds.
Such theoretical commitments can be defended. See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC
ANALYSIS OF LAw 15-23 (2d ed. 1977) (defending economic efficiency as the ultimate
criterion); Kay, supra note 52, at 236-92 (defending deference to historical intent as
inherent in constitutionalism). Such theoretical commitments to homogeneity,
however, are notoriously vulnerable to counterarguments.
88 See Kennedy, supra note 65, at 1685; West, supra note 2, at 81-90 (arguing that
the "male legal culture" frames its justificatory arguments in response to men's
hedonic lives and that a different and alternative conceptual framework is offered
through an understanding of women's hedonic lives).
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their justificatory reasoning. One judge may argue that stopping
drivers at random to check for intoxication implicates the fourth
amendment, but is justified by exigency and is a minimal infringe-
ment.8 9 Another judge reaching the same decision may argue that
stopping drivers at random does not implicate the fourth amend-
ment at all.
Theorists characteristically ignore the fact that judges disagree
in a third and much more interesting way: in their ways of
structuring information-counting some kinds of propositions as
evidence for other propositions and resting their arguments on one
kind of proposition rather than another because the former is
conclusive in their particular way of understanding experience. A
judge may cite social conditions as ultimate reasons for a decision,
for example the fact that one class of individuals is systematically
disadvantaged.9 0 Another judge may claim that psychological
effects on individuals are of primary importance.9 1 A third judge
may cite economic facts as ultimate, for example the fact that the
more-or-less efficient market distribution of goods or benefits in
society will be compromised or curtailed.92 Yet another will look
89 See, e.g., Stark v. Perpich, 590 F. Supp. 1057 (D. Minn. 1984) (holding that
stopping vehicles at a roadside drunk driving survey constitutes a seizure under the
Fourth Amendment, but that such seizures may still be permissible under certain
circumstances); Garrettv. Goodwin, 569 F. Supp. 106 (E.D. Ark. 1982) (same, but also
dismissing Fourteenth Amendment considerations); Little v. State, 479 A.2d 903 (Md.
1984) (same).
90 See, e.g., Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 219 (1986) (Stevens,J, dissenting)
(stating that a state's justification for selective application of a statute must be
supported by a "neutral interest" and not just a mere dislike for the disfavored
group); Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 373-74 (1886) (holding that the result of
systematic denial ofpermission to Chinese people to carry on businesses demonstrat-
ed a violation' of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment).
91 See, e.g., Bowers, 478 U.S. at 205 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (claiming that
"individuals define themselves in a significant way through their intimate sexual
relationships with others" and for the Government to dictate the norms of sexual
conduct would have severe psychological implications for the individual citizen);
Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483,494 (1954) ("To separate [schoolchildren]
from others of similar age and qualifications solely because of their race generates a
feeling of inferiority as to their status in the community that may affect their hearts
and minds in a way very unlikely ever to be undone.").
92 See, e.g., POSNER, supra note 87, at 525 (stating that "although there are
pecuniary gains to trade between blacks and whites ... by increasing the contact
between members of the two races such trade imposes nonpecuniary, but real, costs
on those members of either race who dislike association with members of the other
race"). Wrongful birth cases also illustrate judges' differing strategies in finding
moral or economic modes of justification relevant and decisive. See e.g., Ochs v.
Borrelli, 445 A.2d 883, 885 (Conn. 1982) (focusing on the economic injury caused by
physician's negligence); Cockrum v. Baumgartner, 425 N.E.2d 968 (I1. App. Ct. 1981)
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to political effects, assessing the likelihood that participation in
government and the enjoyment of the benefits of democracy will be
diminished.93 Still another may look to the values or principles
deliberately implanted by the founders of the Constitution and will
take as ultimate the importance of adherence to those principles.
94
1. Disagreement Among Judges
One may address the complexity of a deliberative practice by
taking note of the different, mutually recognized justificatory
strategies that it embraces, different ways of ordering categories of
knowledge or of using modes of explanation. One can also describe
this complexity as wholly individualized, since each individual judge
will have personal ways of juxtaposing and relating justifications
drawn from her beliefs. Her strategies of reasoning will necessarily
differ, at least in some ways, from those of each of her colleagues.
No two judges will write exactly the same judicial opinions. Each
will have different starting and finishing points for argument,
different ways of deciding what is the explanans and what is the
explanandum.
95
2. The Bounds of Judicial Disagreement
Why and how does debate among judges persist in the face of
this structural bias against agreement and harmony? One must
remember what binds judges into a shared practice as well as what
is personal and idiosyncratic.
First, any judge understands and anticipates that other judges
(in the case of an unwanted birth, finding that "the [emotional] rewards of parent-
hood should not be allowed in mitigation of rearing costs [damages]"), rev'd 447
N.E.2d 385 (Ill. 1983); Berman v. Allan, 404 A.2d 8, 14-15 (N.J. 1979) (apparently
weighing moral and economic considerations against each other).
s These concerns may be seen as central in a wide array of opinions. John Hart
Ely has argued at length for their centrality. See ELY, supra note 29, at 135-99.
94 See cases and examples cited approvingly by Berger and Kay, supra note 52.
95 An important implication of my analysis is that there is no sharp or clean
distinction between facts and values. The justificatory arguments of individuals
include both facts and values, as well as intricate logical relationships among factual
and value-based beliefs. For example, certain "factual" convictions about how persons
are motivated, how they are affected by adversity, and how power relationships are
perceived and perpetuated will (in conjunction with other premises and other beliefs)
lead to certain "value" conclusions about what is fair and unfair in the regulation of
such persons' lives. Convictions about fairness or justice or mercy-all of them
"values'-may serve as premises or as conclusions ofjustificatory arguments. The
same multiple roles are assumed by "facts."
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will have different patterns or styles of reasoning. More important-
ly, she understands that only certain patterns are intelligible as
being within the practice. Thus ajudge who decides cases in favor
of the taller party, by reference to astrological projections, or by
deferring to the ambassador of Lichtenstein would be intelligible in
the sense that one could anticipate her responses but not intelligible
as a participant in the practice of judicial decision-making.
96
The practice involves a family of ways of structuring and
ordering relevant evidence for decision-making. Each judge
recognizes that other judges reason in certain ways, recognizes how
they reason, and can give some account of why they reason as they
do. The practice is bounded not by a single shared style of
reasoning but by familiar, if unspecifiable, criteria for the kinds of
reasoning that count. In the absence of such criteria, the practice
would fall apart. Yet the criteria are malleable, and the line
between included and excluded ways of thinking and of justifying
decisions is not sharp.
97
3. The Driving Force of Judicial Persuasion
The mutual recognition of permissible styles ofjustification does
not sufficiently explain the persistence of deliberation among
judges. When persons recognize that others have different ways of
arriving at truth, that others favor economic or psychological or
moral arguments, they continue to deliberate. Why do they persist?
96 See supra note 81 and accompanying text.
97 Obviously such criteria evolve; what counts as acceptable, recognizable style or
content changes over time. References to natural, inalienable rights "under God"
may have been an acceptable mode ofjustification in the early nineteenth century.
The use of natural law in contemporary opinions is more covert and wears the guise
of fundamental rights explained in terms of familiar social facts and substantive due
process. See, e.g., Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503-04 (1977)
(stating that constitutional protection of the sanctity of the family is not confined to
an arbitrary boundary drawn at the limits of the nuclear family, and that limits on
substantive due process should be drawn from basic societal values); Roe v. Wade,
410 U.S. 113, 152-53 (1973) (concluding that the right to privacy existing "under the
Constitution" encompasses a woman's decision to terminate her pregnancy); Griswold
v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479,486 (1965) (concluding that the institution of marriage
confers upon individuals a right of privacy "older than the Bill of Rights"). Evolving
notions of what is expected and understood as the appropriate content ofjustification
are even more clearly marked. Efficiency of distribution of resources has come to be
treated as a covert but ultimately political value by some judges, see POSNER, supra
note 87, at 415 (stating that "when judges are the makers of the substantive law the
rules of law will tend to be consistent with the dictates of efficiency"), a mode of
justification unknown and unanticipatable a generation or more ago.
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What kinds of success do they hope for?
The answer seems to lie in the stake that participants have in
their ways of thinking, in their ways of proceeding within the
practice. The participants themselves see what they are doing not
simply as optional verbal gestures but as manifestations of the
process of understanding the world-understanding why events
occur, what purposes they serve, and what goals are worth serving.
This is true in judicial debate as in all other cognitive and delibera-
tive activity.
Onejudge, for example, may see economic events and economic
motives as the operative levers of human and social action. For the
world to be intelligible to her, she will not only describe events in
accord with this commitment but will also try to persuade others to
see the world in this way. The fact that others do not see the world
this way is for her a recalcitrant experience, not just one of several
recognized options. At the same time, she recognizes that a
different judge will describe things and justify opinions differently,
and she will feel committed to move others to understand and
adopt her explanatory strategies, her ways of making sense of the
world. But she recognizes that there are no agreed-upon or neutral
standards of justification, no meta-game wherein she can justify
once and for all her way of thinking.
98
Each individual will hold certain convictions as basic and
unshakable, as criteria for weighing the importance of other reasons
and justifications. Onejudge or commentator will see a system that
perpetuates any kind of racial discrimination as prima facie
unacceptable. 99  Another, believing that freedom to pursue
economic goals is essential to any system of liberty and autonomy
and that certain groups have been denied this freedom, may view
discrimination as justified in some cases.100 Yet another may see
98 This point is controversial. Any theorist who claims that a particular method
or mode of justification-such as original intent-is analytically the only correct
method and is implied by the idea of constitutionalism, and any theorist who similarly
claims to have identified a value to which all other values are reducible, e.g. economic
efficiency, will reject this conclusion. My suggestion is that no method exists to
validate such competing claims of correctness.
9 See e.g., City of Richmond v.J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 520 (1989) (Scalia,
J., concurring) ("I do not agree... with [the Court's dicta] suggesting that, despite
the Fourteenth Amendment, state and local governments may in some circumstances
discriminate on the basis of race in order (in abroad sense) 'to ameliorate the effects
of past discrimination.'").
100 See, e.g., id. at 529 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (stating that "the Richmond City
Council has supported its determination that minorities have been wrongly excluded
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the essence of constitutionalism in preserving the limited role of the
federal government as envisaged in the Federalist papers and the
debates among founders. 10 1 For a fourth, a perception of our
society as involving and perpetuating an invidious social structure
may determine what results can and cannot be justified.
1 0 2
It is hard to overestimate the interest any person has in her way
of making sense of experience, solving hard questions, and making
judgments. One clings to modes or styles of thinking more
tenaciously and profoundly than one does to particular opin-
ions.103 It is more vital to one's continuing identity to believe, for
example, that psychological or sociological data are the tools by
which issues are resolved than to cling, come what may, to any
particular judgment that such data yield.10 4 Thus, debates within
deliberative practices are perpetuated by the need to assert both
solutions to hard and disputed questions and particular ways of
arriving at such solutions. The attempt to persuade others to "see"
the world in the same way as one sees it oneself is parasitic upon
from local construction contracting.... These are precisely the types of statistical
and testimonial evidence which, until today, this Court had credited in cases
approving of race-conscious measures designed to remedy past discrimination.").
101 See, e.g., PAUL BREST & SANFORD LEvINsON, PROCESSES OF CONSTITUTIONAL
DECISIONMAKING 422 (2d ed.1983) ("After examining the debates in the Thirty-ninth
Congress, [Raoul Berger] concludes that the adopters of the Fourteenth Amendment
merely intended to ensure the constitutionality of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 and
that Brown and almost all other Supreme Court decisions under the Fourteenth
Amendment are incorrect." (citing BERGER, supra note 52, at 10)).
102 See Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954)
103 Wittgenstein focuses attention on the importance to the individual of certain
ways of reasoning-
559. You must bear in mind that the language-game is so to say something
unpredictable. I mean: it is not based on grounds. It is not reasonable (or
unreasonable).
It is there-like our life.
608. Is it wrong for me to be guided in my actions by the propositions of
physics? Am I to say I have no good ground for doing so? Isn't precisely
this what we call a 'good ground'?
609. Supposing we met people who did not regard that as a telling reason.
Now, how do we imagine this? Instead of the physicist, they consult an
oracle. (And for that reason we consider them primitive.) Is it wrong for
them to consult an oracle and be guided by it?-If we call this 'wrong' aren't
we using our language-game as a base from which to combat theirs?
616. Why, would it be unthinkable that I should stay in the saddle however
much the facts bucked?
W1TTGENSTEIN, supra note 1, at 73, 80-81.
104 See id.
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the habit of giving structure to one's own experience, of deploying
one's strategies of thinking.
4. The Grounds of Persuasion and Change
These strategies are recursive in the sense that they include the
possibility, virtually the certainty, of self-modification through
understanding and continually reconsidering the strategies of
others. This prospect of evolving exists both for the individual and
for the shared practice as a whole. What seems false or unaccept-
able to a person at one time may come to be a central truth by
which other claims arejudged. 10 5 For the deliberative practice as a
whole, some precepts and justificatory patterns that seem revolu-
tionary at one time may be widely regarded as common sense a
generation later. The role of privacy and autonomy in interpreting
constitutional rights is just one such example.
10 6
D. Immersion in Practice as an Obstacle to Theory
The question of whether judges are playing by the same or
different rules when they disagree and offer incommensurable
justifications is therefore oversimplified and nonsensical. On the
one hand, judges recognize and are influenced by each other's
moves. They share standards of relevance and recognize each
other's ways of reasoning as variant forms within a shared practice.
On the other hand, they go about thinking and reasoning in
different ways. They have a stake in their own ways of thinking
simply because these are their ways of thinking and making sense of
experience.
They are participants in the same deliberative practice and yet
they participate differently. The game metaphor fails because it is
not illuminating to view these characteristic ways of ordering
experience as a matter of following rules. Rules, even when they
105 Wittgenstein (writing in 1948-50) speaks of the inconceivability of any person
getting to the moon or of any person not having two parents. Id. at 36, 37.
106 See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152-53 (1973) (tracing development of the
Court's concept of a right to privacy); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484
(1965) (discussing the growth of privacy "penumbras" around specific guarantees in
the Bill of Rights). Consider also the example of the pattern of analysis and
justification inspired by footnote four in United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304
U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938), which raised the question of "whether prejudice against
discrete and insular minorities may be a special condition" in applying the general
prohibitions of the Fourteenth Amendment. See, e.g., ELY, supra note 29, at 148-70.
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are second nature, can be made completely the objects of conscious-
ness and, hypothetically, the objects of choice. One can imagine
alternative rules for playing baseball or for describing colors and say
to oneself, "These are the rules that I choose." x0 7 But a way of
thinking and experiencing is not a set of rules. It is an evolving way
of thinking, a way of proceeding in which one has a stake and from
which one can abstract oneself only provisionally, only tentative-
ly. I0 8
The sense in which judicial reasoning is a shared practice is
captured by the way in which it has aspects of practices in general.
The first aspect is the public character of practices. A mode of
thinking, feeling, and speaking must already be generally shared
within the culture before it can be appropriated by the individual.
It must be present to be learned. Whatever diversity exists in
possible ways of thinking and feeling is a publicly shared and
mutually acknowledged diversity.
10 9
The second aspect is individuality. Since each person has an
individual history, her ways of feeling, thinking and expressing
herself will reflect that personal history. 10 She will create her
personal variation on shared themes. Even judges who share a
commitment to, for example, originalism or social equality as
methodological constraints in decision-making, will carry out such
reasoning in distinctively personal ways.
The third aspect is immediacy. A deliberative practice is not
simply a way of using language or a method of moving from
evidence to conclusions. It is a way of being in touch with reality,
a way of giving shape and order to experience."' To say it is
107 Unless one generates a community of fellow-users of the new rules, the rules
are useless for communication or other forms of action. See WITGENSTEIN, supra
note 22, at 75-95 (discussing the difficulties of conceiving of a private language).
108 See FISH, NATURALLY, supra note 19, at 436-67 (discussing various processes of
self-critical thinking).
109 Nonetheless, creativity and innovation are possible insofar as each person puts
received elements together in unique and unforeseeable ways, ways that may come
to resonate within the community. Creativity is possible and explicable within legal
doctrine just as it is within the so-called creative arts.
110 See STRAWSON, supra note 68, at 41 (stating that "[t]he principles of individ-
uation of [private] experiences essentially turn on the identities of the persons to
whose histories they belong").
111 In other words, the classic philosophical confrontation between coherence and
correspondence theories of linguistic meaning and truth is, for my purposes,
accommodated by observing that coherence accounts make sense insofar as there is
no realm of objects other than the objects of experience and language, and that those
objects are experienced as given (and in that sense as real).
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immediate is not to say that it is unchangeable. Becoming self-
conscious of one's distinctive way of ordering reality may be a
precondition of such change. 112 Thus, a judge may surely under-
stand herself as an originalist, for example, or as believing that
certain social goals "make more sense" than all others.113 And
she may question that distinctive way of ordering beliefs and change
her ways of thinking. At the same time, she cannot abstract herself
altogether into a position of indifference or into a sense that her
way of thinking is, in the end, arbitrary.
14
The immediacy of our practices of reasoning has an important
implication. Inevitably, we deliberate not about how we see things
but about how things are. Since we are within a frame, we lose
sight of it as a frame. But we cannot forget it altogether, aware as
we are that other persons have other frames. This means that any
philosophical reflection about reasoning sensitizes us to a kind of
tension between the certainty that attaches to what is most familiar,
to the ways of thinking that are second nature, and to the sense that
such certainty is ungrounded. Others with a different stake in
reality-with other moral, religious, scientific certainties-and with
different ways of thinking may be fellow conversants in our
practices.
Any adequate theory of legal reasoning must address the
consequences of viewing judicial reasoning as a deliberative
practice. It must take account of both the heterogeneity of
justification and the idiosyncratic character of individual strategies
ofjustification. Even more importantly, it must take account of the
tension between the role of practitioner and theorist-a tension not
reducible to roles, to removing one hat and putting on another.
Because engaging in a deliberative practice involves having
convictions about reality and explanation, the practitioner asking
theoretical questions can never bootstrap herself out of the tension
and into a posture of neutrality or indifference about those
convictions. A theorist who pretends she can disables herself from
describing law adequately.
115
Failure to understand judicial reasoning as a deliberative
112 See FISH, NATURALLY, supra note 19, at 141-60 (discussing change within
"interpretive communities").
113 This description emphasizes thatvalues are experienced as given, or incumbent
on one, rather than as chosen.
114 Seesupra text accompanying note 98; see generally HUME, supra note 71, at 181-
218 (discussing the interplay between passion and will).
115 See infra Part IV.
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practice colors the contribution of both older jurisprudence,
characterized by debates about legal positivism, and newer jurispru-
dence, characterized by the skeptical claims of antifoundationalists.
Thus, the idea of judging as a deliberative practice can bridge the
preoccupations of old and new jurisprudence.
III. LEGAL POSITIVISM AND LAW AS A DELIBERATIVE PRACTICE
A. Positivism and Judging
Some of the main claims of legal positivism are incompatible
with seeing law as a deliberative practice. However, a critique of
positivism from this standpoint yields modifications that turn
positivism into a stronger, more compelling theory of law. In order
to assess this new strength it is necessary to identify the salient
aspects of positivism.
1. Positivism and the Identification of Law
The still-evolving debate between positivists116 and their critics
has centered on how judges identify law.117 The question of what
law is and how it is to be identified is also a question about the
limits of law. When does law run out? When does a judge exhaust
her resources for identifying law and move beyond those limits?
118
116 Legal positivism, like all philosophical "isms," refers to a family of views and
positions. H.L.A. Hart andJoseph Raz are the most influential recent legal positivists.
Commenting on "the elusive meaning of 'positivism'," Raz describes its controversies
with nonpositivists as a function of the identification of law, the moral value of law,
and the meaning of key terms within legal discourse. JOSEPH RAZ, THE AUTHORITY
OF LAW 37 (1979).
Note in this context that "the identification of law" can have several meanings
since ordinary citizens, judges, and attorneys all need to identify law and do so in
different ways.
117 The background assumption of these debates seems to be that judges are at
the fulcrum of decision-making and of debate within the legal system and have as
their job the identification of law even when that job is most difficult. Citizens can
decline to make judgments in hard cases and attorneys can prepare briefs on both
sides of a question, but judges must choose and justify their choices.
The fact that both positivists (for instance, Hart and Raz) and their critics (such
as Dworkin) explain the identification of law by observing the behavior and discourse
of appellatejudges can be explained in a different way. Judges have been recognized
in the history ofjurisprudence as having the most controversial role of various legal
actors. Legislators uncontroversially have the task of creating law. Attorneys and
citizens have the burden of obeying the law and working within it. But judges are
variously seen as applying the law and/or creating it.
118 At its inception, legal positivism was not explicitly a theory about the
identification of law byjudges so much as a theory about the nature of law tout court.
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Whatever their differences, positivists address the problem of
identifying law by emphasizing the importance of distinguishing
"law as it is" from "law as it ought to be."119 Their basic intuition
is that the process of identifying the law is separate conceptually
from the process of projecting aspirations for what the law might
become and the goals it might serve. The first process uses formal
criteria to identify the events of law creation. The second process
uses moral reasoning, prudential reasoning, and other kinds of
normative argument to consider ways in which the law might change
in the future.
2. Raz's Positivism
Joseph Raz preserves this distinction when he identifies the
"sources thesis" as the essence of legal positivism. 120 To say that
one identifies law by resort to formal criteria is to say that one
identifies law by ascertaining whether particular law-creating events
occurred. One looks, therefore, to social facts. Justificatory
arguments play no part in the identification process because law,
duly created, stands as law regardless of anyjustificatory arguments
offered in its favor or in criticism.
121
Early positivists tied law to power, suggesting that the legal order is established when
rules are imposed by those who have stable (political) power over those who lack such
power. John Austin, for example, represents law as commands backed by sanctions.
The capacity to enforce sanctions and to make the threat of sanctions effective
depends on power. One aspect of a legal order, according to this account, is that the
rules express the wishes of the commander. See JOHN AUSTIN, THE PROVINCE OF
JURISPRUDENCE DETERMINED ETC. 9-33 (Isaiah Berlin et al. eds., 1954) (1832). Such
wishes may be indefinitely variable in their content. They may or may not coincide
with the interest of the governed. They may in fact harm the governed in serious and
unjustifiable ways.
H.L.A. Hart's positivistic account of law does not depend on particular
assumptions about the relative power of individuals. See HART, supra note 21, at 1-25,
49-76. Austin's account, based on power assumptions, can not explain how law could
bind all individuals, authorities as well as citizens, or how law could exist in a system
in which power rested ultimately with the population at large, e.g. the electorate.
Hart offers an institutional theory of law whereby a legal system exists whenever
stable institutions promulgate rules that establish order in the society at large. The
rules are of two kinds, primary rules that order the lives of all citizens and secondary
rules that instruct and empower authorities in making, interpreting, and executing
the rules. See id. at 77-96.
'19 H.L.A. Hart, Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals, 71 HARv. L. REV.
593, 594 (1958); see RAZ, supra note 116, at 37-45.
120 See id. at 47.
121 It does not necessarily follow that one may ignore morality in identifying the
law. Morality may be relevant insofar as it is embodied in social facts that are
criterial. A criterion for law might be that a rule becomes law only as a result of a
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This positivist account of law has the important corollary that
the law has gaps.122 Whenever (according to relevant social facts)
a rule does not exist for a particular situation, the law is undeter-
mined. 12 3 Determining the gaps may be difficult and controver-
sial, and one may come to feel that the social facts do not, in this
sense, speak for themselves.
3. Dworkin's Criticisms
Critics of positivism such as Ronald Dworkin challenge the
positivist's claim that identifying the law is a matter of looking at
social facts and not a matter of producing justificatory argu-
ments. 124 Dworkin suggests that judges go through a different
and more complex process of deliberation when they try to identify
the law, one in which social facts and justificatory arguments are
inextricably bound. 125 In rejecting positivism, Dworkin argues
that justificatory arguments play an essential role in the process of
identifying law.126 Dworkin's critique anticipates some of the
insights of law as a deliberative practice, while falling short, as we
shall see, in other respects.
B. The Limitations of Positivism
Viewing law as a deliberative practice shows how problematic
the central claims of positivism are. It requires us to extend and
modify the positivist understanding of the identification of law. We
must look critically at the positivist's claims about the criteria of
validity (the sources thesis), the nature and role of justificatory
popular referendum, and the referendum might ask voters for approval or
disapproval on moral grounds. In this example the positivist's claim stands. The
judge-or other player-who is trying to identify the law appeals to social fact and has
no occasion to offerjustificatory arguments of her own. See id. at 38-39 (explaining
that the "social facts by which we identify the law" may "endow [the law] with moral
merit," but the law itself does not "of necessity conform to ... moral values").
122 See id. at 73 (stating that "the source thesis makes [gaps] unavoidable since it
makes law dependent on human action with its attendant indeterminacies").
123 See id. at 70.
124 Dworkin puts to one side whether, from the standpoint of the citizen,
identifyingand citing the requirements of law are indeed (as Raz maintains) a matter
of social fact, as they appear to be. For example, determining the taxability of one's
capital gains involves consulting rules that have a particular pedigree, rules that came
into effect through the actions of authorized individuals. Being able to point to the
.social fact" that these actions occurred is sufficient to identify the law.
125 See DWORKIN, supra note 36, at 238-66; DWORKIN, supra note 47, at 81-130.
126 See infra part III.C.1.
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arguments in law, the appropriate role of theorists and participants
(the game metaphor), and the existence of legal gaps.
1. Criteria of Validity
Notwithstanding the positivist suggestion that clear criteria
(social facts) identify valid legal rules, the practice of judicial
decision-making exists because rules of law are continually and
characteristically in dispute. Judges who disagree offer significantly
different conceptions of the rules. In considering hard cases,
appellate judges necessarily ask whether fellowjudges see the law as
they do, take differences of opinion and result seriously, and argue
about whether and how the law has changed. For positivists, a
second-order set of game-like rules applies to judges' deliberations.
These rules direct the judge to use certain sources of law.
127
Having identified the law, the judge may decide that the case falls
in the gaps of the law128 and may, in a discretionary way, use
considerations outside the law to make new law.
129
Critics such as Dworkin offer a different picture of judging.
They imply that a judge's understanding and use of such game-like
rules is necessarily colored ab initio by preconceptions about the
interests at issue in the particular case, their weight and importance,
and the relation of the case to other situations and contexts. Each
judge makes decisions about relevance in the light of ajustificatory
127 Hart explains:
The simplest form of remedy for the uncertainty of the regime of
primary rules is the introduction ofwhat we shall call a'rule of recognition'.
This will specify some feature or features possession of which by a suggested
rule is taken as a conclusive affirmative indication that it is a rule of the
group to be supported by the social pressure it exerts.
HART, supra note 21, at 92 (emphasis omitted).
128 Raz argues:
Questions of intention and meaning may have no answer.... Where
the facts which are legal reasons are indeterminate, through vagueness,
open texture, or some other factors, certain legal statements are neither
true nor false .... It is worth noting that this kind of legal gap is not the
law's peculiarity. They are totally dependent on and derive from gaps in
statements of an ordinary and not a particularly legal kind such as
statements about intentions and language. It is the indeterminacy of
ordinary everyday facts which generates legal gaps.
RAZ, supra note 116, at 72-73 (footnote omitted).
129 See HART, supra note 21, at 132 (stating that the "open texture of law means
that there are, indeed, areas of conduct where much must be left to be developed by
courts or officials striking a balance, in the light of circumstances, between competing
interests which vary in weight from case to case").
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argument identifying the interests that matter.
1 3 0
Dworkin's view of judging is compatible with seeing judicial
decisionmaking as a deliberative practice. Without a framework
derived from her own way of interpreting experience and giving
value, the judge cannot know where to begin. The process of
identifying the law cannot be reduced to rules because it cannot be
separated from the judge's distinctive way of conceivingjustificatory
arguments and using them to work toward a decision. What the
judge sees as determinate and indeterminate in the law is colored
by her understanding of the justificatory arguments that the law
encompasses.
131
Disagreement among judges therefore extends both to the
criteria by which they treat the available body of precedent
(decisions and arguments) and to their conception of the goals and
interests at issue. Although they may agree on the importance of
order and fairness, hard problems are not solved at this level of
generality. If they were, judges would not disagree with each other.
The argument against shared second-order rules for judging is
that the standards of decision-making are inherently disputable.
Judges lack shared bases for determining how the ingredients of
decision yielded up by the sources of law are to be weighed and
fitted together. As a result, justificatory arguments are needed at
every stage to support these controversial determinations. Nojudge
sees herself, as some positivist descriptions suggest, as engaged in
a bifurcated task of first applying the first-order rules when possible
and then looking to resources outside the rules when application of
the first-order rules is not possible. At any level but the most
abstract, judges may disagree about the point of their activity and
the goals to be achieved.
2. The Meaning of Legal Justification
Do positivists misdescribe the kinds of justification found in
judicial reasoning? Their account of law implies that there are three
kinds of justificatory moves in legal discourse. One kind is a
demonstration that a particular rule is a first-order rule of the
system performed by displaying the rule's pedigree. 132  The
130 See DWORKIN, supra note 36, at 238-66; DWORKIN, supra note 47, at 81-130.
131 Of course, none of this is fixed. Thejudge's confrontation with the arguments
of others or with new circumstances for applying the law-new cases-may lead her to
reconceive aspects of her understanding of the law and look at a point of relevant law
in a new way.
132 This notion ofjustification follows directly from the positivist account of legal
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second kind is an account of why (or why not) a case falls within the
scope of the relevant first-order rule. 33 If the case falls outside,
a third kind of justification is appropriate: an argument for the
extension of the law in terms of the purpose that is thus
achieved.
1 34
Positivists see these three kinds of justifications as offering an
exhaustive analysis ofjustification as it arises in different aspects of
the process of decision-making. In the actual use of justificatory
strategies by judges, however, justification cannot be analyzed in this
way. Questions about the scope of relevant law and about the
purposes to be achieved by particular results are typically not
distinguishable in judicial opinions.13 5  Identifying the law itself
necessarily involves justificatory arguments.
Such a melding of the question of identifying the law with the
question ofjustifying particular results is not an aberration from the
ordinary context of decision-making; it is the ordinary context.
Participating in a deliberative practice, a judge has a stake in a
validity. See HART, supra note 21, at 97-107.
13 This notion of justification falls within the positivist conception of open
texture. See id. at 124-32 (explaining that rules will at some point prove indetermi-
nate, possessing what is called an open texture).
134 The role of consequentialist arguments and other kinds of "second-order"
justifications are discussed at length by writers in the positivist tradition. See, e.g.,
MACCORMICK, supra note 21, at 100-51.
135 In Bowers v. Hardwick, Justice White, speaking for the Court, wrote:
[W]e think it evident that none of the rights announced in [such cases as
Pierce, Skinner, Griswold, and Roe] bears any resemblance to the claimed
constitutional right of homosexuals to engage in acts of sodomy that is
asserted in this case.... [A]ny claim that these cases nevertheless stand for
the proposition that any kind of private sexual conduct between consenting
adults is constitutionally insulated from state proscription is unsupportable.
Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 190-91 (1986) (citations omitted). Was White
identifying the law, that is the scope of the right of privacy, or was he justifying a
limitation upon it by finding a conceptual difference, embedded in how he and some
others view human experience, between some private acts and others? Clearly he was
doing both, and the distinction between the two-identification and justification-is
idle.
In Rochin v. California, the Court held it to be a violation of due process for
officers to compel evidence from a defendant by forcing him to yield up the contents
of his stomach. The Court said, "This is conduct that shocks the conscience....
[These] are methods too close to the rack and the screw to permit of constitutional
differentiation." Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172 (1952) (FrankfurterJ.). Did
this constitute identification of the scope of the law, or did it offer ajustification by
explicit reference to moral limits and moral similarities? Clearly it did both. The
point is perfectly general: in virtually any opinion, the processes of identifying the
law and of offering up justifications for a decision are inseparable.
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particular way of interpreting experience and therefore in a
particular way of putting together the elements of a legal system.
judges mutually understand the various styles and assumptions
encompassed within their shared deliberative practice, and such
understanding is crucial to the ongoing practice, but it does not
generally or necessarily move them toward convergence.
3. Participants and Theorists
Positivists ascribe different roles to participants (judges) and
theorists (observers). Participants make justificatory moves in the
course of making decisions while theorists analyze the formal
structure of rule-governed activities.1 36 This means that positivists
separate the analytic and the normative aspects of legal theory.
13 7
What law is and what law ought to be are separate issues. The job
of the judge is bifurcated between justifying decisions within the
scope of existing law (the first and second kinds ofjustification) and
justifying new or gap-filling law by extralegal considerations (the
third kind of justification). The theorist's job is bifurcated between
describing the practice of legal reasoning and criticizing its substance.
136 This distinction is implicit in the positivist's separation of law as it is and law
as it ought to be. H.L.A. Hart explains:
[I]t is ... important to distinguish as belonging to the philosophy of law
certain groups of questions which remain to be answered even when a high
degree of competence or mastery of particular legal systems [by] ...
empirical and dogmatic studies... has been gained. Three such groups
may be distinguished: problems of definition and analysis, problems of
legal reasoning, and problems of the criticism of law.
H.L.A. HART, ESSAYS IN JURISPRUDENCE AND PHILOSOPHY 88-89 (1983).
For critics of positivism, problems of definition and analysis are not altogether
separable from problems of the criticism of law. "It is his neglect to analyze the
demands of a morality of order that leads [Hart] throughout his essay to treat law as
a datum projecting itself into human experience and not as an object of human
striving." Lon L. Fuller, Positivism and Fidelity to Law-A Reply to Professor Hart, 71
HARv. L. REV. 630, 646 (1958). The point of stressing the diversity ofjustificatory
strategies in deliberative practices is that each judge conceives of law as "an object of
human striving" in a different way, that such commitments affect theorists as well as
judges, and that a full account of the definition and analysis of law will betray the
theorist's own commitments.
137 See HART, supra note 136, at 88-89. In The Concept of Law, Hart separates his
consideration of analytic questions (chapters one through seven) from his consider-
ation of questions of the criticism of law (chapters eight and nine). See HART, supra
note 21. Compare RAZ, supra note 116 (discussing analytical questions) andJOSEPH
RAz, THE CONCEPT OF A LEGAL SYSTEM (1970) (analyzing legal systems) withJOSEPH
RAz, THE MORALITY OF FREEDOM (1986) (discussing moral criticism of law). Both
Hart and Raz see these questions as falling into separable domains ofjurisprudential
inquiry.
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To see judicial decision-making as a deliberative practice is to
see that such clear lines of demarcation are illusory. Just as ajudge
will necessarily make justificatory arguments in the course of
identifying the law and will have a particular stake in a way of
ordering the results, a theorist will look at the institutions of law in
terms of the justificatory arguments that are relevant to its exis-
tence.138 The positivist is correct that part of the theoretical task
is to understand what law is by identifying law with a particular
institutional structure. Making sense of that institutional structure,
however, requires a choice among various explanatory data-
political, social, economic, psychological, and so on. The choice
that a particular theorist makes will represent that theorist's own
way of making sense of experience. A theorist will also have to
address a range of questions about the functional, dysfunctional, or
nonfunctional character of legal decisions and official acts. In so
doing, she will have to confront the availability or absence of
particular justificatory arguments for what the legal system does.
Thus the tasks of judge and theorist, while hardly the same, are
isomorphic in a way to which the game-based metaphor of insider/
outsider cannot do justice. It is unsatisfactory to imply, as positiv-
ism does, that ajudge (insider) applies rules and on occasion creates
new law while a theorist (outsider) describes the institutional
structure generated by such rules. Both the judge and the theorist
are participants in deliberative practices. They deliberate for
different ends: the judge deliberates to decide cases, while the
theorist deliberates to arrive at an adequate characterization of law.
But when both judges and theorists disagree with their peers, their
disagreements turn on differences with their peers in the way
experience is understood, differences in preferred explanatory
strategies. Thus, both judges and theorists have a stake in a
personal way of understanding the place of law in the social order
because each judge and each theorist is necessarily a partisan of some
particular and controversial way of arriving at knowledge and
certainty.
138 Thus, one theorist may identify the institutions of law with order and
discipline, another with the realization of justice, and yet another with the
coordination of wants and aspirations. Moreover, the theorist's elaboration of the
demands of order orjustice or want-satisfaction will depend in turn on that theorist's
way of understanding human psychology, history, politics, morality, etc.
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4. Dissolving the Dichotomies of Positivism
The main pillars of positivism are undermined by these three
criticisms of positivist approaches to identifying the law, to the
nature of justification, and to the relation of theory and practice.
The claim that law can be identified by recourse to formal sources
without the use of justificatory arguments fails. From the stand-
point of law as a deliberative practice, every attempt to link
disparate elements-statutes, case holdings, constitutional clauses-is
a way of understanding and creating order. The shared practice is
defined by the collection of permissible and mutually recognizable
ways of creating order. Each participant's way of creating order is
in part idiosyncratic and each is called upon to justify her way of
doing so at every stage.
a. Existing Law and New Law
Positivism's conceptual distinction between cases in which a
judge applies law at its core and cases in which a judge must reach
outside the law to make new law139 is problematic. In practice,
the claim that a judge is making new law is generally reserved as a
criticism for some results with which one disagrees. Judges
themselves do not use this bifurcation to describe their own
decisions, but rather characterize all their own decisions as
interpreting and extending existing law. At the same time, they
often accuse those with whom they disagree of making new law and
therefore of being self-evidently in error.140
The implication is not that judges always deploy "old law" but
that the .distinction between old and new law, and the dilemmas it
spawns, must be dissolved. Each judge identifies law and legal
reasoning with certain analytic strategies and moral/social/political
principles, and her decisions use those strategies and principles to
address new issues. The decisions are old insofar as the judge does
139 See HART, supra note 21, at 124-32 (describing legal rules' open texture). See
also supra note 132.
140 Even Roe v. Wade, a case that seems to many commentators a clear instance of
judicial lawmaking, is presented as an application of existing law. "This right of
privacy, whether it be founded in the Fourteenth Amendment's concept of personal
liberty.., as we feel it is, or... in the Ninth Amendment... is broad enough to
encompass a woman's decision whether or not to terminate her pregnancy." Roe v.
Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973) (Blackmun, J.). And dissenters predictably see and
accuse the majority of making new law: "I have difficulty in concluding... that the
right of 'privacy' is involved in this case." Id. at 172 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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not reinvent strategies and principles with each case, and new
insofar as particular issues have not been met before.
Seeing law as a deliberative practice explains why "new law" is
an epithet of criticism. Each individual judge, as we have seen, has
a favored account of the methods and goals of the enterprise;
accordingly, one will try to reconstruct the social order that seemed
to be set in place by the founders, another will look to a consensus
about goals and rights within the political and cultural community
as it has evolved, and so on. Moreover, a particular judge will
necessarily have to vary her methods to meet the demands of
different kinds of cases. In a consistent and principled way, she
may decide some cases by reference to economic considerations,
others by reference to historical intent, and still others by looking
at fairness, freedom, and other moral values.
141
Every judge will therefore find some cases that require the use
of resources that are not generally seen by others as part of the law.
Some judges will use controversial resources more readily than
others.142 What seems to one judge a decision within agreed
upon bounds of the law will seem to another a creative extension of
the law.
The alternatives confronted by positivists and their critics are
therefore a misleading way of posing the issue. Positivists suppose
that one can sort cases into applications of pre-existing ("old") law
and instances of law creation. Their critics, like Dworkin, argue that
all cases are applications of pre-existing law.143 Both claims fail.
141 For example, she may use economic criteria in antitrust cases, copyright and
trademark cases; she may be guided by historical considerations in deciding cases
about the balance of powers among the three branches of government; and she may
refer to fairness and freedom in deciding cases under the First, Fourth, and Fifth
Amendments. She will be able to explain why she finds economic criteria relevant to
one sort of case, historical concerns to another, and fairness and freedom to others.
Moreover, what distinguishes her justificatory strategies is not only how she
categorizes various cases but also the particular economic, historical, and moral
convictions that she regards as true and relevant.
142 Justice William Douglas was, throughout his career, seen, praised, and pilloried
for being an innovator of this kind. See generally VERN COUNTRYMAN, THE JUDICIAL
REcoRD OFJUSTICE WILUAM 0. DOUGLAS (1974) (discussingJustice Douglas's career
on the United States Supreme Court).
143 See DWORKN, supra note 50, at 119-45. Dworkin states that
[t]he question ... of whether there are no-right-answer cases in a
particular jurisdiction, [that is, cases in which existing law does not
anticipate a right answer]-and whether such cases are rare or numerous-is
not an ordinary empirical question. I believe that such cases, if they exist
at all, must be extremely rare in the United States and Great Britain....
The argument that I am wrong must.., be a philosophical argument.
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The process for arriving at and justifying decisions does not warrant
either description, nor does it afford a perspective from which
either description can be made.
Rather than applying existing law or making new law, judges
draw on their individual strategies within the mutually familiar
dimensions of the practice to solve a problem and create intellectual
order. Some cases will be similar to existing precedents and give
rise to little surprise or controversy. Other cases will seem more
creative and disputable. The latter may continue to be described by
observers as "making" law rather than "applying" it, but such a
dichotomy will rightly be treated as naive and oversimple by judges
themselves.
b. Law and Gaps
The same oversimplification is involved in the question of
whether law has gaps, a question which also dissolves under
scrutiny. On one hand, some cases involve significantly new
questions and give rise to controversy. On the other, the range of
strategies of decision available within the deliberative practice are
almost always predictable, as is the range of the solutions they
would yield. Of course, particular results in close binary cases
144
cannot be anticipated. But the family of relevant arguments for
each side of the binary question can and will be anticipated.
c. Law as It Is and Law as It Ought to Be
A third positivist claim is that theorists must keep in mind a
clear distinction between what law is and what it ought to be. In
particular, positivists maintain that justificatory arguments are used
in determining what law ought to be but not in determining what
it is.
If justificatory arguments in fact play an essential part in both
It must challenge my assumption that in a complex and comprehensive legal
system it is antecedently unlikely that two theories will differ sufficiently to
demand difficult answers in some case and yet provide equally good fit with
the relevant legal materials.
Id. at 144-45.
144 All cases are binary, of course, insofar as the claim of the plaintiff may either
be upheld or denied. My suggestion is that the "gappiness" of a given case dissolves
into the answers to such questions as: What decision is consistent with the
justificatory argument (within the law) that I (as judge) find most compelling and
relevant? How similar is this case to existing precedents? How much diversity can
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processes, then the distinction does not hold. Moreover, the
distinction between settled law and new law is itself problematic.
What one judge considers new law another judge will consider an
application of established principles. It is thus simplistic to try to
sort decisions into categories of those that reiterate settled law and
those that announce what the law ought to be.
The distinction between what the law is and what it ought to be
can, however, be translated into two functional distinctions. First,
any judge would concede that some cases require creative extension
of the law. Judges know that at some point what is generally
regarded as settled law runs out. What does not run out is the
capacity of each point of view within the practice to generate
strategies to address unsettled questions. The distinction between
what the law is and what it is becoming, according to the judge's
way of viewing the law's justificatory strategies, remains real.
Second, every judge must recognize cases in which constraints
of law require a result different from what she would choose had
she been free to adjudicate on a clean slate. In that sense as well,
therefore, what law is is one thing, what it ought to be is anoth-
er.1
45
C. Dworkin's Criticisms and Deliberative Practices
Ronald Dworkin's response to legal positivism dovetails in some
respects with the view of law as a deliberative practice. He claims
that justificatory arguments are part of the process of identifying
the law, that the law does not have gaps, and that no sharp
distinction can be drawn between law as it is and law as it ought to
be.146 His account is, however, deficient in significant ways.
I expect among my colleagues (both in decision andjustificatory strategy) in deciding
-this case? How much controversy will any decision of this case generate?
145 Throughout this article, I assume that judges usejustificatory strategies that
they themselves find compelling and that reflect their own stake in a way of thinking,
in a way of making sense of experience. I assume, in other words, thatjudges judge
in good faith. For a general discussion of this assumption, see STEVEN J. BURTON,
JUDGING IN GOOD FAITH (1992).
146 See DWORKIN, supra note 36, at 225-75; DWORKIN, supra note 47, at 81-149.
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1. The Self-Understanding of Judges
The judge as participant in a deliberative practice is in tension
between (1) having a stake in both a particular result and a
particular way of defending that result and (2) being aware that the
practice embraces otherjustificatory strategies, some of which yield
contrary results. 147  The judge's attitude toward her persuasive
powers is also bifurcated. She aspires in the short term to bring
other judges around to her way of reasoning and to address the
larger audience that reads and criticizes judicial opinions. At the
same time, she is aware that she has no transcendental argument for
the superiority of her way of proceeding or for a neutral standard
by which ways of thinking are to be measured or ranked. She knows
that in the long run the diversity of views and strategies that is
characteristic of the practice will almost certainly persist.
Dworkin seems sanguine about resolving these tensions. By his
account, a judge sees it as her task to offer the most comprehensive
and defensible account of the rules and principles of the evolving
legal system. 148  The values and rights reflected in her account
yield a complete legal system insofar as they anticipate a single
"best" resolution of all hard cases. 14 9  Even if a judge cannot
convince her colleagues to adopt the same reconstruction of the
legal system, she will remain convinced that all other strategies
which yield different results are inferior. This conviction will be an
essential part of her position. What is wrong with this characteriza-
tion?
a. The Bases of Disagreement
Dworkin's account distorts the main obstacle to agreement by
misconceiving the character of judges' disagreement. The problem
is not only that judges accord different weight to different princi-
ples, as Dworkin claims, but that they have different ways of
147 Of course, other judges may arrive at the same decision by different means.
148 See Dworkin, NATURAL, supra note 54, at 169-73. Dworkin analogizes the
interpretation of law to the interpretation of novels:
We [must distinguish] two dimensions of a successful interpretation. An
interpretation must "fit" the data it interprets, in order not to show the
novel as sloppy or incoherent, and it must also show that data in its best
light, as serving as well as can be some proper ambition of novels.
Id. at 170.
149 See DWORKIN, supra note 50, at 143-45 (arguing that rarely, if ever, do judges
believe that there is no correct answer).
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ordering categories of evidence. Thus, one judge will give argumen-
tative finality to social and moral arguments of a utilitarian
character. Yet this judge can also recognize that the deliberative
practice includes some judges who justify results by appeal to the
structure of original intentions embodied in the Constitution and
statutes and still others who argue by appeal to economic efficiency.
It is one thing to have a stake in a particular way of understand-
ing evidence and constructing arguments. It is another thing to
have a stake in a particular social agenda with its attendant values
and goals. For Dworkin, judges differ essentially in the second way:
they reconstruct in different ways the evolved system of social values
that comprises the constitutional system.150 Each judge is in a
position to see his reconstruction as superior and as broad enough
to encompass the entire practice. Each judge clearly has a vested
interest in maintaining this perception.
b. Understanding Other Judges
The picture of law as a deliberative practice, however, tells a
different story. If judges also differ in the ways in which they
understand evidence and construct arguments, and if they are aware
of these differences, then they see their peers as not merely telling
inferior stories but as telling characteristically different kinds of
stories-political stories, economic stories, psychological stories, and
historical stories. This awareness may cause them to hesitate before
ranking such differences as superior or inferior and may lead them
to a better understanding of why others resist accepting their
stories.
15 1
For Dworkin, all judges are in one sense playing by the same
rules or strategies since they are deploying the two dimensions of
legal analysis: fit and justifiability. 152 Judges in a deliberative
practice, however, play by different rules and have different modes
of arguing, reasoning, and thinking, a fact they understand,
anticipate, and respect. This acknowledgement creates a tension
between their stakes in their individual strategies and in the
150 See DwoRKiN, supra note 36, at 257-58 (concluding that when ajudge is faced
with a hard case he is forced "to develop his conception of law and his political
morality together in a mutually supporting way.").
151 I am not arguing, however, that this recognition will undercut or diminish
one's own stake in one's way of proceeding, one's justificatory and analytical
strategies.
152 See supra note 150.
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multiform practice itself. The first stake is a stake the judge has by
virtue of his position as a participant and a decision-maker. The
second stake reflects the judge's awareness of the nature of the
practice and his participation in it. The voice of the judge simulta-
neously expresses both stakes.
1 53
c. The "Best" Interpretation of the Law
Dworkin says that the task of the judge is to produce the "best"
interpretation of the law.154 What becomes of that claim when
law is seen as a deliberative practice? A judge is most likely to
defend her interpretation as the best to those who share at least
some elements of his own strategy. Two judges similarly disposed
to reconstruct original intent may still join issue with divergent
views of original intent. On the other hand, two judges with
different strategies may have to acknowledge the absence of any
measure between them. Certainly each judge will continue to think
of his own strategy and judgment as "best" in some sense. But the
claim will be enlightened by awareness of this dual challenge, in
terms of result and in strategy of thinking.
This distinction between Dworkin's position and mine is not a
distinction between objective and subjective conceptions of what is
"best." Any judicial opinion is an objective judgment insofar as it
is a claim made from the perspective of a particular way of ordering
evidence and justified by arguments marshalled from that perspec-
tive. All judicial opinions share these traits, and in this sense all
arguments are therefore objective.1 55 Decisions are not any less
objective because they involve strategies of justification that are to
some extent individualized.
153 The coexistence of these two stakes should not be reduced simply to the
degree of modesty of the judge or the degree of respect she has for her colleagues.
It is a conceptual matter that the two stakes coexist, regardless of whether the judge
is actively thinking about them or not; it is not an empirical matter dependent on the
judge's attitude or personality.
154 See DWORKIN, supra note 36, at 239 (comparing judicial decisionmaking to
literary story writing).
155 Both Dworkin and Fish tend to equate the requirement of objectivity with
transcendentaIjustification, which is itself impossible to achieve. See DWORKIN, supra
note 36, at 85-86; FIsH, NATURALLY, supra note 19, at 87-88, 436-37. Dworkin
identifies the call for objectivity with the call for a definitive argument rqfuting
external skepticism. DWORKIN, supra note 36, at 85-86 (stating that the "only
skepticism worth anything is skepticism of the internal kind").
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2. The Completeness of Law
Dworkin takes a strong stand on the completeness of law. Along
with some other proponents of legal naturalism, he shares the
assumption that the principles and values of the legal system
anticipate decisions for all cases. Therefore, no decision involves
making new law. As reconstructed by each judge, the values and
ideals embodied in the law color and shape each new hard case so
that it is a reading of what is already implicit.
From the standpoint of law as a deliberative practice, this claim
must be sharply qualified. One may agree with Dworkin that every
hard case summons up an array of interests and values that have
surfaced in other cases and on which any judge has probably taken
a stand. Only in this sense is a place in the legal system already
prepared for any new judicial decision.
The claim that the decision in every hard case is already part of
the law and that judges never create new law is nonetheless
counterintuitive. However, the positivists' claim that judges
sometimes make new law is also counterintuitive, and both claims
rest on oversimplification. Everyjudge sees some cases as requiring
her to extend legal arguments in ways they have not been extended
before.1 58 At the same time, she does not think of herself as
sometimes applying preexisting law and sometimes making new law.
Rather, she sees her responses to some cases as creative and
innovative, and she expects them to be surprising and controversial.
The static metaphor of inside/outside yields to the dynamic
metaphor of growth and extended reach.
The idea of closure and completeness is inapposite to the extent
that judges are aware that legal reasoning involves not just one
strategy of reasoning. Every decision is likely to invoke coexisting
yet competing strategies, with each strategy yielding its own
innovations and each capable of providing for growth and develop-
ment of the law in a different way.157 Again, the claim that the law
156 See supra text accompanying notes 139-45.
157 Again, one could cite examples endlessly. In DeShaney v. Winnebago County
Dep't of Social Servs., 489 U.S. 189 (1988), the Court refused to hold a state agency
liable when the agency, having intervened in a child abuse situation, failed to take
reasonable measures to protect the victim. Speaking for the majority, ChiefJustice
Rehnquist relied on the framers' intent in interpreting due process to exclude claims
against the state when harm resulted from purely private action. See id. at 196-97
(stating that the purpose of the Due Process clause "was to protect the people from
the State, not to ensure that the State protected them from each other"). In dissent,
Justice Brennan examined the evolving duty of the state to protect individuals in
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anticipates particular results will seem vastly oversimplified to any
judge who understands the law as a collection of different strategies
and a perpetual contest among them.
IV. ANTIFOUNDATIONALISM AND PRAGMATISM
Viewing law as a deliberative practice allows us to transform the
"old" jurisprudence by reinterpreting the claims of positivists and
liberal/naturalist critics. This approach does so largely by question-
ing the scope and possibility of consensus and by emphasizing that
the practice is made up of conflicting and irreconcilable points of
view or strategies of decision. This way of summarizing the critique
seems to assimilate the description of law as a deliberative practice
with critical theory or antifoundationalism-the "new"jurisprudence.
That would be wrong. Just as it faults the old jurisprudence for
misconstruing agreement, that is, for misdescribing the limits of law
and the role of justification, the view of law as a deliberative
practice finds in critical theory a defective picture of the scope and
nature of disagreement.
158
A. From Old to New Jurisprudence
Antifoundationalists reject what Robert Gordon calls "evolution-
ary functionalism," 59 a general conception of law as evolving to
realize social values by meeting human needs.160  Evolutionary
whose behalf it has begun to act. See id. at 207 (Brennan,J., dissenting) (recognizing
"that 'the State's knowledge of[an] individual's predicament [and] its expressions of
intent to help him' can amount to a 'limitation on his freedom to act on his own
behalf.'") (alteration in original) (citation omitted). Justice Blackmun stressed the
general role of the state in preventing harm. See id. at 213 (Blackmun,J., dissenting)
(calling for a "sympathetic" ruling). It is easy to imagine a more general use of the
framers' intent criterion to limit claims against the state and overturn existing
precedents in which, for example, public officials acting in what is arguably a private
capacity have been held liable. On the other hand, expansive use of the notion of the
state's obligation to prevent harm by private persons could lead to new kinds of tort
claims against the state, and new obligations for state agencies. Another approach
to this issue could be grounded on economic efficiency, specifically on an analysis of
which party is best situated to prevent harm in such cases at least cost to the parties
and to society.
15s Obviously, one might argue that the difference between my theory and critical
legal theory, or for that matter between my theory and Dworkin's theory, is a matter
of nuance and emphasis rather than a difference in kind. That determination, in
turn, depends on whether one is impressed more by what the theories have in
common or by what differentiates them. Such a determination rests in the hands of
the reader.
159 Gordon, supra note 3, at 68.
160 Positivists and antifoundationalists both attack what I have called consensus
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functionalism comes in two guises. For consensus theorists, the law
incorporates principles that represent such social values, principles
that constantly require interpretation and extension. For positivists,
law is a neutral tool that can either be used to realize social values
or to subvert them.
161
Antifoundational skeptics do not simply reserve normative
questions about needs and social values; they subvert them.
Positivists take no position on the truth of propositions linking law,
need, and social values in practice; they commend the conceptual
distinctiveness of law as it is and law as it ought to be without
regard to whether law embodies social values founded on human
needs. Antifoundationalists, however, do take a position on these
propositions: they tend to regard the rhetoric of needs and shared
values as camouflage for the use of power to create order and to
give the veneer of justification without the substance. Like
theory, represented in contemporary debates most conspicuously by liberalism.
Consensus theory maintains that law embodies shared social values and that the
judge's job is to ferret out, interpret, and apply them. If this were all that consensus
theory held, then positivists would have no cause for rejecting the view that
identifying the law may involve recourse to shared values. Consensus theorists also
maintain, however, that the process of identifying the law involves justificatory
arguments for particular values-arguments showing both that the values are shared
and that they explicate what is good. Consensus theory thus bridges what law is and
what it ought to be and takes on a task that is simultaneously descriptive and
normative. In this way consensus theory stands directly against a major tenet of
positivism.
Liberals modify consensus theory by distinguishing public values, in particular
freedom and equality, from personal values. The liberal argument is that by realizing
public values, a legal system can remain neutral vis-a-vis personal values. The point
is sometimes made more strongly: some liberal theorists claim that the public values
of liberalism entail neutrality affecting private preferences. See, e.g., H.L.A. HART,
LAW, LIBERTY, AND MORALrrY 20 (1963) (noting that legal coercion of positive social
morality "calls forjustification as somethingprimafacie objectionable, to be tolerated
only for the sake of some countervailing good"); RAWLS, supra note 38, at 207-08
(noting that "from the perspective of the original position, there is no way of
ascertaining the relative strength of various doctrines").
161 See Hart, supra note 119, at 615-21 (noting the problems posed by the historical
example of Nazi Germany for positivist conceptions of law).
Defining law as order effected and sustained through authority, positivism holds
that the substance of law, and afortiori any question of whether law serves human
needs, is irrelevant to the identity of law. From the point of view of positivism, all
three essential claims of consensus theory-that there are universal human needs, that
such needs are the ground of social value, and that law expresses and realizes these
values-are irrelevant to identifying law. The point of identifying ani citing
something as law is, in Raz's sophisticated version of positivism, a way of preempting
justificatory moves and thus putting such normative claims about law in their
separate, distinct, and important place. See supra text accompanying notes 124-26.
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positivists, they stress order and power; unlike positivists, they give
the terms a critical import and tell a normative story.
16 2
The new jurisprudence has two aspects: the skeptical and
destabilizing arguments of the critical theory espoused by antifound-
ationalists, and the attempt to resolve these arguments in the social
and philosophical theory of pragmatism. Each deserves indepen-
dent examination.
B. The Limits of Critical Theory
1. Myths of Value Pluralism
Critical theory invites the use of the philosophical technique of
dissolving questions by undermining their foundations. 163  This
technique is exemplified by our discussion of the positivist's
question of whether and when judges properly step outside the law
when deciding hard cases.16 4  No simple answer is satisfactory,
and our analysis of the deliberative role ofjudges explains why this
is so.165
The same kind of technique applies when the question is
162 Kelman states:
"Progressivism" may be undercut by the view that legal change simply
reflects the dominance of whichever pernicious elite has grabbed a greater
degree of control, the view that "modernization" is predominantly gloomy,
destroys communal bonds, decent work, faith, and family, and/or that
development has generally moved us from a society of independent, civic-
minded, and public-spirited citizens to a bunch ofatomistic profit grabbers.
KELMAN, supra note 2, at 243. Similarly, Kathleen Lahey comments that
[o]ne of the greatest accomplishments of feminist legal scholarship has been
to identify the ideological content of masculist legal theory, of legal
reasoning, and indeed, ofreasoning itself. To point out that this ideological
content actually affects the real and lived lives of women is merely to
demonstrate that ideas become real through ideology and that reality affects
ideology....
- [W]omen who involve themselves with power processes live within
the shadow of ideologies that are compatible with the acquisition and
exercise of power. Thus it would not be surprising to find that women who
are involved in power processes are themselves influenced by the very forces
that they think they are combatting.
Kathleen A. Lahey, Reasonable Women and the Law, in AT THE BOUNDARIES OF LAW
3, 3-4 (Martha A. Fineman & Nancy S. Thomadsen eds., 1991).
163 See Wrr-rGENSTEIN, supra note 22, at 51 (stating that "the clarity that we are
aiming at is indeed complete clarity. But this simply means that the philosophical
problems should completely disappear.")
164 See supra part II.
165 See supra text accompanying notes 127-45.
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whether or not different judges adhere to reconcilable value
systems. Naturalist critics of positivism, notably Fiss and Dworkin,
struggle to show that reconciliation of value systems is manifest,
especially in the light of the liberal's distinction between public
values and private values. 166 Naturalists also claim to demonstrate
that the public values fleshed out in the constitutional system of
rights offer answers to hard legal questions. Answers thus are
forthcoming so long as the Constitution is interpreted through the
liberal principle that the legal system exists to provide equal
concern and respect for all individuals167 and to position all
persons equally in the struggle to achieve personal values.1 68 The
liberal consensus theorist tries to have both harmony and diversity.
Skeptical critics argue that one precludes the other. The price of
harmony is coercion; the cost of diversity is strife.
In contemporary jurisprudence, critical legal theorists have the
distinction of making this point both descriptively and normatively,
and they combine description with normative conclusions in an
innovative way. The descriptive element alone is long familiar:
philosophers throughout history have claimed that persons have
differing value convictions and that value systems are therefore
irreconcilable. 169  Even some of the most prominent liberal
theorists, includingJohn Ely, 170 acquiesce in this notion.
In contrast, critical legal theorists such as Kennedy, 171 Tush-
net,172 and Gordon,173 give the claim a normative spin. Recall
that consensus theorists refer to fundamental needs and interests,
166 See supra note 48. Note that critics of positivism who argue that law and moral
argument are indissolubly linked tend to be labeled (sometimes by themselves)
"naturalists," although the link to natural law theory is attenuated at best. Natural law
theory, properly so-called, stresses universal rules of social organization, while writers
such as Dworkin and Fiss discuss the links between the legal and moral rules and
beliefs of a particular society or community.
167 See DWORKIN, supra note 47, at 180-83.
168 See RAWLS, supra note 38, at 90-94.
169 See THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 63 (Michael Oakeshott ed., Oxford 1946)
(1651).
170 See ELY, supra note 29.
171 See Kennedy, supra note 9, at213-17 (discussingthe legitimizing nature of legal
thinking and categorical schemes).
172 See TUSHNET, supra note 50, at 313 (concluding that proponents of the
possibility of constitutional theory advocate the imposition of the values of a
particular elite).
173 See Gordon, supra note 3, at 100-09 (summarizing varieties of critical legal
historiography and describing the relationship between constitutive legal rules and
the Hobbesian state of war).
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such as the need for concern and respect. To reject the idea of
fundamental needs and interests and describe the realm of value as
one of competing political agendas is, for critical theorists, to
conclude that law is used to make one or another political agenda
dominant. This turns law into a manifestation of a "legitimating
ideology,"174 a story about value that is one of many possible
stories, no one of which has priority. Law is thus inherently subject
to criticism for claiming legitimacy that it lacks.
Consensus theorists answer the "one value system or many"
question by reconciling diversity within one system; skeptics claim
there are many. But the question itself rests on a distinction
between fact and value, a distinction with a long history in philoso-
phy and in what passes for common sense.175 The theory is that
since descriptive discourse and evaluative discourse (fact and value)
are separate, any general agreement about facts (of science, history,
geography, etc.) has no implications for agreement or disagreement
about value. Whether there is one value system or many is
independently determinable.
To the extent that the "one value system or many" question rests
on the fact and value distinction, it should be dissolved rather than
answered. To understand deliberative practices is to see that what
we call facts and values are interconnected and inseparable in
justificatory structures. The justification of what is generally called
a value claim, such as the infringement of a plaintiffs right to
privacy or of his civil right against discrimination, is a legal
argument consisting of facts of various kinds-historical, psychologi-
cal, sociological, and so on. The judge, in offering a justificatory
argument, assumes that there is a logical relationship between the
facts and the conclusion. Justification would otherwise be impossi-
ble.1
76
The question of whether judges (or persons generally) have
reconcilable or irreconcilable value systems dissolves into the
question of whether persons have different but reconcilable'
174 Id. at 93.
175 See supra notes 90-95 and accompanying text (discussing the relationship
between fact and value).
176 Thus, one judge may derive from the fact that the intent of the founders was
to limit the scope of governmental intervention the evaluative conclusion that the
claimant has no legal right to have privacy claims vindicated. Another judge may
derive from the fact that a given allocation of burdens would be economically
inefficient the evaluative conclusion that the claimant must bear the burden of a
particular economic arrangement.
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justificatory patterns, reconcilable ways of pooling their beliefs
about human nature, society, and the world, and of drawing
conclusions from those beliefs. Differences over capital punish-
ment, affirmative action, the rights of criminal defendants, and
abortion are not simply the products of different systems of value,
unrelated to fact. They are the functions of differing understand-
ings of human nature, human history, human malleability, original
sin, and so on, endlessly. Whether we call some of these beliefs
values and some facts is nominal and arbitrary. What matters is that
we see them as competing ways of orienting oneself to experience.
Understanding of law as a deliberative practice suggests that
participants will generally recognize agreement of three kinds. They
will agree on broad generalities about need and social value. They
will agree on formal procedures for debate and decision. And they
will agree in the mutual recognition of relevant arguments.
Through these understandings, participants will know the dimen-
sions of the debate. But none of this agreement assures consensus,
not because participants subscribe to different value systems but
because they have different histories and therefore different
strategies for knowing, reasoning, and justifying. The vital stake
that each participant has in ways of thinking will tend to perpetuate
such debate, but the fact that their ways of thinking incorporate
active consideration and evaluation of others' ways of thinking
moves them toward change and accommodation. The most legal
theory can tell us is that all debate is carried out in tension between
these tendencies. The normative lesson, such as it is, is to maximize
empathic consideration of alternative ways of thinking.
177
2. Conceptual Frameworks
Some critical legal theorists are fully aware that the irreconcil-
able differences they claim to find are not between value systems as
such but between ways of thinking that link fact and value. They
regard such ways of thinking as discrete conceptual frameworks or
conceptual schemes. Feminist theorists in particular appreciate the
relationship between fact and value and argue that gender bias
infects ways of describing the world.1 78 They are not alone, as
17 7 To the extent that one kind of value transcends all other kinds, arguably the
value of openness and empathy toward the ways of thinking (justificatory strategies)
of others is such a value. This claim echoes John Stuart Mill's commendation of a
marketplace of ideas. SeeJOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 18-21 (David Spitz ed.,
W.W. Norton & Co. 1975) (1859).
178 See e.g., MARTHA MINoW, MAIYiN ALL THE DIFFERENCE 219 (1990) (arguing
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Robert Gordon remarks, in "historiciz[ing] consciousness."
179
Their point is simple and in many respects compatible with an
understanding of deliberative practices.
For critical theory, the historical dimension is just one of many
ways in which conceptual frameworks are said to be relativized.
Different groups of persons are characterized by different ways of
thinking and feeling, understanding and experiencing. The
divisions among groups are both diachronic and synchronic. Kuhn's
insight into conceptual revolutions tends to emphasize change over
time, resulting in the replacement of one conceptual system by
another. 80 Theorists also try to show that different conceptual
systems coexist, most obviously in different societies, but also within
a given society. 8 1
a. Forms of Conceptual Relativity
In emphasizing conceptual relativity, critical legal theory
distinguishes between the ways of thinking of the empowered and
the powerless, between individualists and communitarians, and
between the morally self-concerned and altruists. They claim that
these fissures run deep, "all the way down" in legal thinking. All
law, in this view, is politics.
18 2
that "relational insights [of feminist theory] show a mutual dependence between
'normal' and 'abnormal' people, and between male norms and women who do not fit
them .... The act ofjudgment depends on and simultaneously forges a relationship.
What qualities that relationship should attain becomes the most important question
of law, informed by feminist theory."); Caroline Whitbeck, A Different Reality: Feminist
Ontology, in ANN GARRY & MARILYN PEARSALL, WOMEN, KNOWLEDGE, AND REALITY
51, 51 (1989) (stating that "[feminist] ontology has at its core a conception of the self-
other relation that is significantly different from the self-other opposition that
underlines so much of so-called 'western thought'. Dualistic ontologies based on the
opposition of self and other generate two related views of the person and of ethics:
the patriarchal view and that of individualism.").
179 Gordon, supra note 3, at 98.
180 See Kuhn, supra note 45, at 144-59.
181 See CLIFFORD GEERTZ, LOCAL KNOWLEDGE 215-19 (1983) (arguing that
localizing forces of time, place, and narrative must be seen as both constructing
knowledge and regulating behavior).
182 According to Duncan Kennedy:
The fundamental contradiction-that relations with others are both
necessary to and incompatible with our freedom-is not only intense. It is
also pervasive. First, it is an aspect of our experience of every form of social
life.... Second, within law, as law is commonly defined, it is not only an
aspect, but the very essence of every problem. There simply are no legal
issues that do not involve directly the problem of the legitimate content of
collective coercion, since there is by definition no legal problem until
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Similarly, most influential feminists argue that women represent
an underexpressed or unexpressed "different voice" not only on
moral, social, and political issues, but also on such issues as human
nature, history, and psychology.18 3 Every field of scholarly activity
has been touched by the notion that a feminist perspective is
distinctive and relatively unheard. Radical feminists add an
important gloss, asserting that the search for this distinctive voice
is tainted by the fact that women have always lived in circumstances
of domination and alienation. For these scholars, the essential
problem is that women cannot know what their voice would say
unless and until they are free. 184  Theorists such as Catharine
MacKinnon stress the need to create rather than to find women's
conceptual systems. She and others admit and address the
paradoxical implications of this claim for their own work.
1 8 5
The burgeoning field of critical race and ethnic studies shares
this picture of conceptual relativity and fragmentation. Writers
such as Richard Delgado and Mari Matsuda broadcast the need for
underrepresented voices of Hispanics, African Americans, native
Americans, and Asian-Americans to be heard.1 8 1 Others question
the authenticity of voices that are the products of domination.
A constant theme of these many forms of critical theory is the
someone has at least imagined that he might invoke the force of the state.
Kennedy, supra note 9, at 213. In a similar vein, Unger states that
[t]he implication of our attack upon formalism is to undermine the attempt
to rescue doctrine through these several stratagems. It is to demonstrate
that a doctrinal practice that puts its hope in the contrast of legal reasoning
to ideology, philosophy, and political prophecy ends up as a collection of
makeshift apologies.
UNGER, supra note 9, at 11.
183 See, e.g., West, supra note 2, at 84-85 (suggesting that women's gender-specific,
different experience may lack historic and linguistic reality in a male-dominated
culture). For the pioneering work on "different voice" theory, see CAROL GILLIGAN,
IN A DIFFERENT VoicE (1982).
184 See CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED 32-45 (1987).
185 Catharine A. MacKinnon, Feminism, Matxism, Method, and the State: An Agenda
for Theoy, 7 SIGNS 515,542-43 (1982) (noting that "[w]omen's bondage, degradation,
damage, complicity, and inferiority ... will operate as barriers to consciousness rather
than as a means of access to what women need to become conscious of in order to
change").
186 See Matsuda, supra note 2, at 358-62 (noting that the "normative intuitions of
those on the bottom are often different from the intuitions of those on top"); see also
Richard Delgado, The Ethereal Scholar: Does Critical Legal Studies Have What Minorities
Want?, 22 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 301, 303-07 (1987) (arguing that critical legal
theory analysis does not take account of minority experience, fails to confront racism,
and may increase vulnerability of minorities).
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relationship of fact and value. Underrepresented groups, it is said
repeatedly, not only have different political agendas, but also have
different ways of thinking, different ways of assembling the facts of
history, anthropology, sociology, psychology, and economics, and
different ways of deploying them as justificatory arguments. This
concern for the multiplicity of justificatory strategies in all their
complexity parallels the lessons derived from attention to delibera-
tive practices.
b. Intractable Questions
Nonetheless, viewing law as a deliberative practice underscores
the limits and ambiguities of conceptual relativity as expressed in
feminism, critical legal studies, and race/ethnic theory. Is a
conceptual system monolithic, so that the elements of a system
belong to it uniquely? What is a basis for distinguishing one
conceptual system from another? Is it possible for those with
different conceptual systems to communicate? How? Can a
conceptual system change? How? What determines whether an
individual has or projects one conceptual system or another?
18 7
These questions are basic, difficult, and long familiar. They
antedate the recent forays of critical legal theorists,188 and the
implications of failing to answer them seem severe. For example,
do the conceptual systems of men and women, white and black
persons, privileged and powerless persons differ altogether? If so,
how is communication possible? If not, what are the 'differences
and how profound and tenacious are they? If the legal system is
wholly the creation and expression of the conceptual system of the
powerful (of men, of white persons), what theoretical explanation
can be given for the possibility of change? How is a person's
conceptual system determined-merely by gender, or by race, or by
social class? Is one presumed to have a particular voice merely
because of one's gender or race? If not, what follows?
The fact that these questions seem intractable is a clue to the
fact that, however much they betray important issues, they too are
pseudo-questions, questions to be dissolved rather than answered.
187 See DONALD DAVIDSON, On the Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme, in INQUIRIES
INTO TRUTH AND INTERPRETATION 182, 182-84 (1984).
188 See generally the various essays collected in the followingvolumes: ACTION AND
INTERPRETATION (Christopher Hookway & Philip Pettit eds., 1978); OBJECTIVITY AND
CULTURAL DIVERGENCE (S.C. Brown ed., 1984); RATIONALITY AND RELATIVISM, supra
note 28.
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When we discuss deliberative practices, the necessary focus of
attention is the individual, with her personal ways of assimilating
experiences, making judgments, and offering justifications. Given
the heterogeneous character of justification, it should be clear that
the individual has many kinds of belief. Some are universal, others
idiosyncratic; some are controversial, others not; some are essential
to her modes of thinking, while others are ones she would easily
abandon."l 9 All aspects of the individual's thinking are a function
of her personal history and capacities. She may believe, for
example, in the free market, in individual responsibility, in personal
corrigibility, and in limited government. These beliefs will be
rooted in her personal "take" on history, economics, psychology,
and so on.
The facts that she is a woman, black, and relatively privileged in
terms of wealth and education-if such is indeed the case-will be
important in determining some of her beliefs, but largely irrelevant
to other beliefs. Her personal history may create unique perspec-
tives on some issues that often distinguish women's or blacks' points
of view.190 None of this can be known apart from her individual
history and no pigeon-holing of her in terms of ethnic group or
gender will tell us what ways of thinking she has or "should
have." 191  Moreover, we underestimate the individual if we
disregard her capacity to recognize, anticipate, and respond to the
alternative ways of thinking of others-her capacity to see herself as
a participant in a diverse and complex deliberative practice.
c. Abandoning Conceptual Relativity
' These objections play havoc with talk about conceptual systems.
The examination of deliberative practices explains how dialogue and
change occur, but it implies that it is nonsense to try to distinguish
one monolithic conceptual system from another, to say that one
ethnic group or gender group has an integrated and distinguishable
way of thinking, or to make insoluble the problem of bridging
189 See supra text accompanying notes 25-28.
190 See RALPH ELLIsON, SHADOW AND AcT xix-xxiii (1972) (asserting the
importance of black authors honestly and accurately depicting their attitudes and
values as they exist, and not as others have conceived these attitudes and values for
them.)
191 This point was illustrated during the Senate hearings that led to the
confirmation of Clarence Thomas to the United States Supreme Court. Aspects of
the confirmation process evinced race-based expectations of various parties.
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conceptual schemes.
192
Attending to deliberative practices accomplishes these tasks in
two ways. It focuses attention on the heterogeneity of belief and
justification as opposed to the homogenizing language of conceptual
systems. Thus, it shows that each aspect of an individual's way of
thinking aligns her with some individuals and separates her from
others. Each aspect-each set of beliefs and mode of justification-
places one in a different community of like thinkers. In addition,
attending to deliberative practices raises doubts about transcending
practices in such a way that one can refer to them as self-contained,
transcendable wholes, conceptual systems.
This does not mean that radicals should be less radical. It does
mean, however, that radicals should frame their arguments by
drawing justifications from within a shared deliberative practice.
They misrepresent their aims and means when they insist on
replacing conceptual schemes rather than challenging individual
beliefs and justificatory strategies within the practice of judging.
3. Semantic Relativity
To summarize, the first subversive move of antifoundationalists
is to assert that value relativity is irreducible. We saw that what is
correct about this assertion is best captured by talking instead about
the relativity of justificatory patterns or strategies-because value
claims are underpinned by reasons, and one's reasons are deter-
mined by one's factual beliefs.193 The second subversive move
links facts and values in asserting conceptual relativity. The insights
achieved by this move are betrayed by the unsupported implication
that one can distinguish discrete conceptual schemes and by the
pseudo-dilemmas to which this implication gives rise.
A third and final subversive move is influenced by hermeneutic
theory and inspired by writers on linguistic deconstruction. 194 It
192 None of these observations is meant to prejudge when persons with different
ways of thinking are or are not able to understand each other or when they will
indeed reason at cross-purposes. They merely imply that the difference is to be
sought in individual patterns of belief, reasoning, and justification rather than in
gender- or race-based conceptual frameworks.
193 See supra notes 189-91 and accompanying text.
194 For provocative and influential writings on this topic, see generallyJoNATHAN
D. CULLER, ON DECONSTRUCTION: THEORY AND CRITICISM AFTER STRUCTURALISM 7-
12 (1982) (providing an overview of the writings on critical theory in the 1970s);
JACQUES DERRIDA, WRITING AND DIFFERENCE xiv (Alan Bass trans., 1978) (1967)
(setting forth a deconstructive account of reading texts); JEAN-FRANCOIS LYOTARD,
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is an attack on the claim, implicit in positivistic theories of law and
formalist theories of language, that words have determinate
meaning.1 95 Although there are many sophisticated variations of
hermeneutic and deconstructive procedures, they share-the idea that
the meaning of a text (utterance) is at least partly indeterminate and
that therefore meaning varies from one reader to another.
Hermeneutics proceeds from a compelling main insight that
one's way of understanding, whether the object be a text or other
experience, is irreducibly affected by one's history.1 96  One can
become self-conscious of these determinants, and thus alter one's
ways of thinking, but one cannot cancel out the personal and
idiosyncratic character of thinking.197  One application of the
hermeneutic insight is that one can never think as the Founders did,
even if one empathetically and perceptively takes account of
historical change over two centuries and tries exhaustively to dispel
naive assumptions about the Founders.
1 98
The main hermeneutic argument can be used in two ways. One
THE POSTMODERN CONDITION: A REPORT ON KNOWLEDGE 3 (Geoff Bennington &
Brian Massumi trans., 1984) (1979) (offering a deconstructive analysis of the criteria
for knowledge).
195 H.L.A. Hart reflects at length on the "open texture" of law which makes it
impossible for judges to carry out a purely deductive or "mechanical" mode of
decision-making. See HART, supra note 21, at 124-32. Thus, Hart distinguishes
between the core and the penumbra of a rule, the latter being the area of application
whereinjudges may use discretion. This distinction does not go far enough because
it suggests that although every rule has a core and a penumbra, the character of the
core and the scope of the penumbra are matters fixed by language. This is not
necessarily so. Judges and others may disagree about the core. A more satisfactory
metaphor for the common or shared element of rules (or words) that make them
generally intelligible is Wittgenstein's metaphor of family resemblances, whereby what
one speaker regards as core-and-penumbra has some elements in common with what
a second speaker regards as the relevant core-and-penumbra, etc. See WITTGENSTEIN,
supra note 22, at 32.
196 Seegenerally HANS-GEORG GADAMER, PHILOSOPHICAL HERMENEUTICS 8-9 (David
E. Linge trans. & ed., 1977) (arguing that "there can be no doubt that the great
horizon of the past, out of which our culture and our present live, influences us in
everything we want, hope for, or fear in the future"); RoYJ. HOwARD, THREE FACES
OF HERMENEtTICS 16-17 (1982) (noting how hermeneutics differs from Kantian
conceptions of reality); HERMENEUTICS: QUESTIONS AND PROSPECTS 4 (Gary Shapiro
& Alan Sica eds., 1984) (introducing a collection of essays on hermeneutics, and
describing hermeneutics as "a type of philosophical activity or praxis, the effort to
understand what is distant in time and culture ... or obscured by ideology or false
consciousness.").
197 See David C. Hoy, Interpreting the Law: Hermeneutical and Poststructuralist
Perspectives, 58 S. CAL. L. REV. 135, 146-47 (1985) (suggesting thatjudges' viewpoints
are necessarily conditioned by history and individual experience).
198 See id. at 150-52, 154-55.
1992]
440 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 141:371
way is atomistic and skeptical and stresses the provisional character
of discourse. It asks whether we can ever trust that meaning is
communicated. At its logical extreme, this approach counterintui-
tively denies the possibility of communication and any kind of
shared belief altogether. 199
The second approach is more moderate and is favored by
traditional hermeneutic theorists. David Hoy, for example, finds in
Hans-Georg Gadamer the following view:
[T]he context itself conditions the reader's grasp of the text, not
the other way around. Furthermore, the context is historical in
that it changes over time with changes in the conditions influenc-
ing various readings. This insistence on historical variation in
interpretation is not in the least subjectivistic or voluntaristic. On
the contrary, the position entails that the reader is not completely
free, to decide the meaning of the text. The text is already
determinate enough, for instance, to narrow the range of possible
contexts.
200
This more compelling and persuasive hermeneutic approach
addresses not the impossibility of communication but its difficulties
and constraints. It emphasizes equally what draws us together and
what is idiosyncratic in strategies of understanding. This is, of
course, a way of concerning oneself with the structure of delibera-
tive practices. In contrast to Tushnet and Gadamer, one who looks
to deliberative practices emphasizes both diachronic and synchronic
variations in ways of understanding experience. Historical change
is only one of the determinants of our variant ways of understand-
199 For example:
[I]deology seems to function best when no one believes in it; more than
that, belief, and even belief in the ideology's own principles and assump-
tions, appears as its greatest enemy. Utopia is not the triumph of (rational)
belief but, on the contrary, the total interdiction of belief. Wittingly or
unwittingly, the great modern philosophies of suspicion and derealization
have brought their modest contributions in that direction .... "
Matei Calinescu, From the One to the Many, in ZErrGEIST IN BABEL 156, 172 (Ingeborg
Hoesterey ed., 1991).
200 Hoy, supra note 197, at 138. Mark Tushnet contrasts the same two approaches
when he says,
[a] fanatic adherent of the hermeneutic method might deny that we can ever
understand the past because the world of the past is not the world within
which we have developed ways of understanding how others act. That,
however, goes too far. We can gain an interpretive understanding of the
past by working from commonalities... both immanent in our history and
constructed by us as we reflect on what our history is.
TUSHNET, supra note 50, at 44.
UNDERSTANDING DISAGREEMENT
ing experience. We are different not only from our ancestors, but
also from each other. And yet our differences must be understood
as variations on shared themes: what makes our practices shared is
the extent to which we can transcend individual strategies, appre-
hending and appreciating the alternatives encompassed by the
shared practice.
C. Applying the Lessons: Pragmatism as Legal Theory
What do we gain by thinking of law as a deliberative practice?
Is the notion merely a description of law and legal reasoning? Is it
theory? If it is theory, does this label imply that it facilitates
substantive work, for example judicial decision-making and the
evaluation of judicial decisions?
Implicit in the description of law as a deliberative practice is
neither hope nor despair. By "hope" I mean something quite
specific: the aspiration to make hard cases easy (or easier) by
showing that one approach to decision-making is fundamentally
correct. Consensus theory is an expression of this kind of
hope.201 Hope in this sense, a malady of philosophers, differs
from run-of-the-mill hope, the hope that one's resolution of a hard
case will convince others. The first kind is the hope of reconceiving
an array of approaches by making a foundational theoretical
advance; the second is the hope of applying one's own approach in
a persuasive way.
By "despair" I mean a solipsistic conviction that conceptual
diversity is unbridgeable in principle. Such despair differs from the
despair that one's own answers and strategies of argument will
prove unpersuasive in particular cases and also from the despairing
realization that human deliberation will always be diverse in
approach and result. Deliberative practices involve bridgeable
diversity.
The philosophical kinds of hope and despair that must be
rejected are based on distorted pictures of actual deliberation.
Wittgenstein says that philosophy "leaves everything as it is."
20 2
This comment is notoriously open to many interpretations.
205
201 See Thomas C. Grey, Holmes and Legal Pragmatism, 41 STAN. L. REv. 787, 799
(1989) (contrasting the traditional Western philosophical goal of establishing a
foundation of knowledge on basic indubitable beliefs with the pragmatist's claim that
knowledge is dependent on context).
202 WITrGENSTEIN, Supra note 22, at 49.
203 See ACKERMAN, supra note 17, at 205 (stating that "Wittgenstein wants to keep
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One plausible interpretation is that theoretical speculation explains
our deliberative practices and, in doing so, dissolves misconceptions
about practices but does not change them. Speculating about
judicial decision-making does not make hard cases easy, but neither
does it make them impossible by showing that what appears to be
a debate among reasoning strategies is really a confrontation of
hermetically-sealed conceptual systems. My description of delibera-
tive practices follows this sense of Wittgenstein's dictum.
The suggestion that law is a deliberative practice is similar in
some ways to recent accounts offered by so-called "legal pragma-
tists." 20 4 Certainly the goals of the two accounts seem similar, as
Thomas Grey implies in his contribution to a recent symposium on
legal pragmatism:
[I]n its very modesty, pragmatism always threatens to usher itself
from the philosophical scene.... The pragmatist says that theory
is no more than commentary on practice, based on premises
drawn from that practice itself or from other practices. This
account of theorizing sounds question-begging to the standard
theorist; its self-imposed practical test (theorize to improve
practice) invites responsive insistence on some independent (i.e.
"genuinely theoretical") criteria by which "improvement" can be
identified.
20 5
While law as a deliberative practice disappoints the same "theoreti-
cal" aspirations, it serves to "improve practice" only indirectly, if at
all. It affects practice through self-awareness, through fostering the
the differences, the jagged edges, and accept what is obviously fragmentary,
contextual, and incomplete"); S. STEPHEN HILMY, THE LATER WITrGENSTEIN 205-06
(1987) (stating that Wittgenstein regards philosophy as only descriptive); ANTHONY
KENNY, THE LEGACY OF WITTGENSTEIN 45 (1984) (stating that "Wittgenstein insists
that philosophy is only philosophical problems. The survey which you make does not
give you the kind of totally new understanding, a surplus understanding, it merely
removes the philosophical problems.").
204 Posner argues that
[allthough pragmaticjurisprudence embraces a richer set of ideas than can
be found in The Nature of the Judicial Process or "The Path of Law," one can
hardly say that there has been much progress, and perhaps in the nature of
pragmatism there cannot be.... [Pragmatism] signals an attitude, an
orientation, at times a change in direction. It clears the underbrush; it does
not plant the forest.
Richard A. Posner, What Has Pragmatism to Offer Law?, 63 S. CAL. L. REV. 1653, 1670
(1990).
205 Thomas Grey, Hear the Other Side: Wallace Stevens and Pragmatist Legal Theoty,
63 S. CAL. L. REV. 1569, 1591 (1990). Grey goes on to say that theories offering such
independent criteria "are not to be had." Id. In this conclusion, he agrees with those
who view law as a deliberative practice.
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self-consciousness examination of one's assumptions and methods.
How does legal pragmatism compare with the account of law
that we have been investigating? Legal pragmatists, as we shall see,
arrive at their conclusions by a different route, by appropriating
rather than distinguishing the skeptical arguments of critical theory.
As the label suggests, they draw links to pragmatic philosophers of
almost a century ago.
20 6
1. Rorty's Pragmatism
If the revival of pragmatism could be attributed to one philoso-
pher, it would be Richard Rorty. Admitting that the term is "vague,
ambiguous, and overworked," he insists nevertheless that pragma-
tism "names the chief glory of our country's intellectual tradi-
tion." 207  For Rorty, pragmatism's greatest importance lies in
showing that "there are no constraints on inquiry save conversation-
al ones-no wholesale constraints derived from the nature of the
objects, or of the mind, or of language, but only those retail
constraints provided by the remarks of our fellow-inquirers.
" 2°s
Furthermore, "[t]he pragmatist tells us that it is useless to hope that
objects will constrain us to believe the truth about them, if only they
are approached with an unclouded mental eye, or a rigorous
method, or a perspicuous language." 20 9  Translated into the
language of deliberative practices, this means that consensus theory
must fail to make hard cases easy because neither the nature of
justice nor human need, nor moral insight, nor linguistic purism can
reduce the diversity of interpretive strategies for approaching hard
cases or determine which strategies are right and which wrong.
That question needs to be dissolved, not answered. No transcen-
dental method, but only our awareness of the range of strategies
intelligible within our deliberative practices, can constrain our
reasoning.
206 For recent writings on jurisprudence and neo-pragmatism, see id.; Steven D.
Smith, The Pursuit of Pragmatism, 100 YALE L.J. 409 (1990); Peter D. Swan, Critical
Legal Theory and the Politics of Pragmatism, 12 DALHOUSIE L.J. 349 (1989); Symposium,
The Renaissance of Pragmatism in American Legal Thought, 63 S. CAL. L. REV. 1569
(1990).207 RICHARD RORTY, CONSEQUENCES OF PRAGMATISM 160 (1982).
208 Id. at 165.
2 09 Id.
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a. Rorty on Solidarity and Individuality
The overriding purpose of Rorty's many essays on pragmatism
is to refute foundationalism. He views the search for foundations,
for a transcendental method, as the prevailing aim and conception
of philosophy. There is, however, a more troubling positive side to
his analysis: a description of how we are situated as reasoners and
what our deliberative practices are like.
What does Rorty mean when he says that the only "constraints
on inquiry" are "provided by the remarks of our fellow-inquirers"?
Does one who participates in inquiry have no other constraints? For
a participant in a deliberative practice, each new question and each
newjudgment must be fitted into the web of beliefs that one already
holds, in which some beliefs are deeply held as criterial and others
held more tentatively. One is constrained, as we have seen, by one's
stake in a particular way of judging. In the face of sufficiently
recalcitrant experience, including the persuasive arguments and
accounts of others, many beliefs may be reordered; one's stake may
change. Nonetheless, for each of us the diverging strategies of
fellow-inquirers are not options equivalent to our own strategies,
but challenges to be met and if possible refuted. Thus, Rorty's
depiction of the individual's relation to other participants and to the
individual's strategies needs examination.
Elsewhere, Rorty states:
There are two principal ways in which reflective human beings
try, by placing their lives in a larger context, to give sense to those
lives. The first is by telling the story of their contribution to a
community.... The second way is to describe themselves as
standing in immediate relation to a nonhuman reality....
[S]tories of the former kind exemplify the desire for solidarity, and
... stories of the latter kind exemplify the desire for objectivi-
ty. ...
The tradition in Western culture which centers around the
notion of the search for Truth ... is the clearest example of the
attempt to find a sense in one's existence by turning away from
solidarity to objectivity. The idea of Truth as something to be
pursued for its own sake, not because it will be good for oneself,
or for one's real or imaginary community, is the central theme of
this tradition.
2 10
Rorty identifies this move from solidarity to objectivity as the
210 RICHARD RORTY, OBJECTIVITY, RELATIVISM, AND TRUTH 21 (1991).
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mistaken move of philosophy. He sees this philosophical gesture as
a kind of blindness, blindness to the limits of deliberative practic-
es.2
11
The problem with Rorty's preference for solidarity over
objectivity is that it is relevant solely at the level of theory and not
at the level of the participant. The sense of "standing in immediate
relation to a nonhuman reality" is itself immediate. How could
experience be otherwise? The impulse to apply strategies of
understanding to find out how things are in "nonhuman reality"-
what is behind the tree, what is the sum of these numbers, what is
the geography of Antarctica-arises spontaneously as an end in
itself. 212 Our stake is expressed in the strategies we employ to
answer these questions and in regarding them as yielding truth, as
putting us in touch with how things are. Even if truth is not the
guarantor of what these strategies yield, as Rorty is correct in
asserting, it is the product of what the strategies yield.
b. Rorty on Theory and Practice
Taken as descriptive of experience, Rorty's account is paradoxi-
cal because it represents participation from the outside rather than
the inside. From the standpoint of an outsider/theorist, the
practice is indeed, as Rorty says, limited only by the collection of
available strategies;213 truth and reality are whatever those strate-
gies yield.214 But to say this is to lose sight of the point of view
of the insider. And ultimately, all of us experience ourselves as
insiders for whom objectivity, or rational deployment of strategies
for arriving at what we regard as truth, matters.
Rorty, in other words, speaks from an impossible position, that
of the pure outsider who is not a participant in practices and
211 See id. at 24.
212 The givenness of experience is a central issue for epistemology. See ARTHUR
C. DANTO, ANALYTICAL PHILOSOPHY OF KNOWLEDGE 141-42 (1968) (stating that even
"if we are in fact products of our experience, this fact is irrelevant to the externality
of experience as an epistemological relationship"); D. HAMLYN, THE THEORY OF
KNOWLEDGE (1970).
213 See supra text accompanying note 208.
214 When presented this way, Rorty's argument has most of the earmarks of what
Dworkin describes as "external skepticism." Dworkin describes external skepticism
as "a metaphysical theory, not an interpretive or moral position ... , [The] theory is
rather a second-level theory about the philosophical standing or classification of
[substantive] claims.... [Such] skepticism is external because disengaged: it claims
to leave the actual conduct of interpretation untouched by its conclusions."
DWORKIN, supra note 36, at 79-80.
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Rorty's recommendations about using the notions of truth and
objectivity are made from that perspective. The position is an
archetypical kind of skepticism that has always had proponents.
2 15
Given this perspective, how can one characterize Rorty's own
analysis? Is it true and objective as a description of the limits of
language? Or is it, on the other hand, simply an expression of
solidarity with a linguistic and conceptual community? Rorty aspires
to the first characterization and not the second.21 6 From the
point of view of insiders to the practice shared with Rorty, these
claims aim to state what is true and to do so objectively.
Another difficulty in Rorty's position echoes the main themes of
this essay. Why does Rorty refer so often to "communities" and so
rarely to individuals? Why is solidarity with a community the
concept that supplants or corrects the aspiration to objectivity? The
clue again lies in Rorty's adoption of the point of view of the
outsider. What is essential to individual (insider) self-awareness is
what I have called a stake in a particular way of organizing experi-
ence, particular strategies of understanding. Each person's
strategies are the unique product of a unique history and unique
capacities. Because recalcitrant experience is always possible, one's
identification with the shared community in which one has learned
these strategies is always in principle subject to rupture.
Individuality in this sense gets short shrift from Rorty. Identify-
ing himself as one of the "partisans of solidarity," 217 he says that
"[i]nsofar as a person is seeking solidarity, she does not ask about
the relation between the practices of the chosen community and
something outside that community."218  Awareness and self-
questioning about the diverse strategies of a deliberative practice
are the essence of individuality and are antithetical to solidarity.
2 19
215 See, e.g., STRAWSON, supra note 68, at 106 (stating that one cannot ascribe
"states of consciousness to oneself, or at all, unless the ascriber already knows how
to ascribe at least some states of consciousness to others .... [W]e must accept [this
conclusion] in order to explain the existence of the conceptual scheme in terms of
which the sceptical problem is stated.").
216 See RORTY, supra note .4, at 315-94.
217 RORTY, supra note 210, at 33.
218 Id. at 21.
219 Rorty is keenly sensitive to the idea that choice is a condition of solidarity and
that privacy matters.
[T]he important questions will be about what sort of human being you want
to become.... [T]his question will divide into two subquestions. The first
is: with what communities should you identify, of which should you think
of yourself as a member? The second is ... what should I do with my
loneness?
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Rorty insufficiently distinguishes two roles of community, and
therefore two senses of solidarity. One sense refers to each person's
debt to her history. In this sense, "community" identifies the
context of learning, of becoming a participant in practices.
Solidarity with that community is never entirely chosen and is likely
to be ruptured over time as one shapes one's ways of thinking
around the recalcitrant experiences of life. The other sense of
solidarity is one's chosen identification with those who are like-
minded. Shared values, backgrounds, and ways of organizing
thought ground such voluntary associations, which are always
subject to revision; opting out is always a possibility. Solidarity in
this sense is never perfect unless it subverts what is individual and
unique. Individuality appears in the transition from community in
the first sense to community in the second.
c. Rorty's Influence
Some critical theorists identify the justificatory and conceptual
strategies of individuals with those of discrete communities. Many
of them assume, as we have seen, that value "systems" or conceptual
"systems" stably define such communities. A failure to address the
relation of individual to community allows them to assume that
race, class, and gender define separate domains and that individuals
simply express and represent the shared experience and understand-
ing of such domains/communities.
220
Martha Minow and Elizabeth Spelman, for example, assert that
for Rorty language "reflects particular human cultures" and describe
him as recommending that "it [is] better to speak within particular
communities about contingent practices."221 Joseph Singer draws
from Rorty the insight that "[a]ll objectivity means is agreement
among people .... [Objective principles are principles ... people
accept."222 The outsider standpoint that these writers borrow
Id. at 13
220 See supra text accompanying notes 182-92.
221 Martha Minow & Elizabeth V. Spelman, In Context, 63 S. CAL. L. REV. 1597,
1611 (1990).
222 Joseph Singer, The Players and the Cards: Nihilism and Legal Theory, 94 YALE
LJ. 1, 35 (1984).
Compare this to the view that objectivity means adherence to a principled and
consistent way of forming judgments, one that is as free as possible of accidental
emotional bias. All of us have, among our strategies of understanding, ways of
checking for consistency and bias as well as relevant modes of self-questioning.
Application of these checks and balances sometimes compels us to arrive at different
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from Rorty collapses the individual's modes of judgment into those
of the group.
More recently Singer has faced the dilemma that this reductive
move sets up: the paradox of understanding how the individual,
whose resources are reduced to those of the group, can possibly
differentiate herself from the group and employ a way of judging
that opposes it. Singer accuses Rorty of conservatism, of "deferring
to the immanent values of 'our' culture," and urges the "need to
understand how our ways of describing the world ... reinforce the
power of dominant groups ... [and the need to understand] the
ways in which our categories ... reinforce illegitimate power
relationships." 223 Both the view that Singer criticizes in Rorty and
the view that he commends assume that one must choose between
conceptual schemes attributable to groups, either the schemes of
the dominant class or of the dominated class. Thus, Singer
identifies the individual's possibilities with the experience of the
group. He also assumes that reasons for judgment are homoge-
neously classifiable as reasons that reinforce power or that under-
mine it.
Rorty is therefore seen as discussing value systems or conceptual
schemes that are group or class-based. Arguing against an objective-
ly privileged method of understanding, he disparages truth and
objectivity by assuming the standpoint of an outsider to any
particular practice. He invites the conclusions that the insider's
aspiration for truth and objectivity is an illusion and that the
individual simply represents the group: discourse is simply a
"conversation" among exemplars of discrete conceptually-separated
groups. Group-based conceptual schemes subvert the distinctive-
ness of the individual's unique strategies of understanding and the
perspective that the individual as insider deploys toward truth.
By contrast, attention to deliberative practices stresses that each
individual's strategies are unique and that shared recognition of
strategies is essential to the existence of a practice. It also shows
that theorists who talk about truth and objectivity must attend to the
ways in which participants in practices understand truth and
objectivity. Rorty's remarks on truth and objectivity reflect an
attempt to transcend particular strategies. But we remain partici-
pants, unable to ascend with Rorty to the ethereal realms and to
judgments and use different principles than those with whom we deliberate.
CsJoseph Singer, Should Lawyers Care About Philosophy?, 1989 DuKE L.J. 1752,
1769.
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absorb the chaste linguistic admonitions of pure theory.224
2. Fish and Interpretive Communities
The critic Stanley Fish is, if anything, even more acute and
persuasive than Rorty in showing the mistakes of foundationalism
in the context of describing deliberative activities. Challenging the
suggestion of consensus theory that "'disciplining rules' . . . will
constrain readers or interpreters and mitigate (if not neutralize) the
inherent ambiguity of texts," and that the rules will "tell you what
to do and prevent you from simply doing whatever you like," Fish
argues that rules cannot have this kind of independence as
constraints because they do not "declare their own significance to
any observer, no matter what his perspective." 225 For each inter-
preter the rules have an idiosyncratic place within her own interpre-
tive strategies. Given the stake each person has in such strategies,
"one cannot," according to Fish, "be meaningfully urged to become
more flexible or generous in one's thinking .... [A]lthough
flexibility and openness may well be the pattern human cognitive
performance traces out, it cannot be a program a human performer
might self-consciously enact." 226 Clarifying this, Fish explains that
he is not saying "that beliefs (and therefore consciousness) cannot
change, only that change will not be from a state of undoubted
belief to a state in which the grip of belief has been relaxed, but
from one state of not-at-the-moment-seen-around belief to anoth-
er."2
27
a. Fish and Deliberative Practices
These descriptions resonate particularly well with the idea of
being situated in a deliberative practice. For example, Fish
persuasively criticizes Catharine MacKinnon in saying that she "is
not, despite her own pronouncements, exhorting us to a new way of
knowing, but to know different things than we currently know
224 It may seem ironic to criticize Rorty on these grounds, since he himself insists
that all discourse is part of a conversation among participants in a practice and that
pure theory is an illusion. However, my argument is that he is inconsistent in holding
that ordinary language is the only language we have, while at the same time taking
a skeptical and revisionary stance toward the concepts of truth and objectivity. He
denies that his position is skeptical or revisionary. See generally RORTY, supra note 4.
225 FISH, NATURALLY, supra note 19, at 121.
226 Id. at 16.
227 Id. at 18.
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(about rape, pornography, etc.) in the same (and only) way we know
anything, by having been convinced of it."228 In this view, it is
sensible to interpret feminist theorists not as urging us to reject and
replace conceptual schemes but as commending new ways of putting
together familiar and unfamiliar experiences by using mutually
intelligible strategies of understanding.
Similarly, Fish contends that, although he is not concerned with
"deny[ing] the distinction between continuing and inventing .... as
in the case of explaining versus changing, the distinction is
interpretive and ... because it is interpretive, one cannot determine
whether a particular piece of behavior is one or the other by
checking it against the text."229 In other words, from the stand-
point of her own interpretive strategies, each judge will see herself
as continuing a course ofjudgment faithful to existing law and will
see others as inventing new law. "[I]nsofar as the distinction is a
mechanism for distinguishing between two forms ofjudicial activity
... it won't work because there is no independent way of determin-
ing whether or not a particular judge is acting in one way [or] the
other."230 Fish seems to say that such distinctions make sense for
the insider but not the outsider.
b. Fish as Pure Theorist
Often, however, Fish himself takes the standpoint of outsider
and seems to declare the distinctions meaningless altogether. "The
distinction between a 'found' history and an 'invented' one is finally
nothing more than a distinction between a persuasive interpretation
and one that has failed to convince."281 This echoes Rorty's
pragmatic claim that successful persuasion is the only measure of
truth.
But for the insider, predictions of persuasive success cannot be
a criterion for truth. For a participant in a deliberative practice, for
instance the judge deciding a case, there is all the difference
between the argument that flows from his commitments, his
strategies of understanding, and an alternative argument he can
imagine constructing, or inventing. The distinction has little if
anything to do with its anticipated persuasive power.
228 Id. at 21.
229 Id. at 109.
230 Id. at 109-10.
231 Stanley Fish, Working on the Chain Gang. Interpretation in Law and Literature,
60 TEX. L. REV. 551, 559 (1982).
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Fish also speaks as an outsider when he says that "[i]n searching
for a way to protect against arbitrary readings (judicial and literary),
Dworkin is searching for something he already has and could not be
without. He conducts his search by projecting as dangers and fears
possibilities that could never be realized." 23 2 What does Fish
mean by saying that arbitrary readings are not possible? Insider/
participants have criteria for what they call arbitrary readings. They
reject some readings (and somejustificatory arguments) as arbitrary
when they are poorly grounded even in the proponent's own
reasoning strategies. On the other hand, for the theorist as
outsider, there is indeed no transcendental criterion for arbitrari-
ness when she, as theorist, compares one justificatory strategy with
another. But to say that all readings are equally arbitrary (or non-
arbitrary) is doubly misleading, both because there can be no
standard for determining equal (or unequal) arbitrariness and
because each of us is in fact an insider, disposed to reason in a
particular way and to deploy internal criteria of arbitrariness. None
of us is in a position to occupy the pure outsider's seat.
233
c. Fish on Interpretive Communities
In using Fish's writings, theorists tend to assimilate the perspec-
tive of the individual into the conceptual categories of the
group. 234 Fish's own statement of the notion of an interpretive
community, one of his main themes, is ambiguous. He says that
[i]nterpretive communities are made up of those who share
interpretive strategies not for reading but for writing texts ....
[S]ince the thoughts an individual can think and the mental
operations he can perform have their source in some or other
interpretive community, he is as much a product of that communi-
ty (acting as an extension of it) as the meanings it enables him to
produce.2
35
232 Id. at 562.
233 Therefore, I regard Fish's comments on the concept of arbitrariness as
revisionary from a skeptical standpoint, just as Rorty's comments about truth and
objectivity turn out to be revisionary. Both, in spite of themselves, commit the
skeptical maneuver analyzed and criticized by Strawson. See STRAWSON, supra note
68, at 103-10.
234 Douzinas's recent critical study of postmodernjurisprudence claims that for
Fish "every community of interpreters, lawyers andjudges, for example, develops its
unique sense ofprofessional competence, etiquette and good sense, with its own tacit
and explicit conventions." DOUZINAS, supra note 6, at 138.
235 FIsH, TEXT, supra note 19, at 14. David Luban's discussion of ambiguity in
Fish's account of interpretive communities and institutions raises the issue of whether
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The terms "share," "source," and "product" are all ambiguous.
Do persons share strategies only when their strategies are the same
or whenever they have overlapping and mutually intelligible
strategies? Does Fish mean in referring to sources and products
that individuals are limited by and reducible to the strategies they
share with all members of the community, or is he saying merely
that the origins of interpretive strategies are in the community and
that its resources are their endowment and history? The latter
reading sheds light on the situation of the individual in a delibera-
tive practice. The former reading ignores individuality and lends
itself to caricature, the picture of discrete and isolatable conceptual
systems which is at the heart of some critical writings.
3. Acceptable Pragmatism and Banal Pragmatism
Legal (neo-)pragmatism has an individualist face which takes
account of the differences of individuals within practices and a
collectivist face which ignores such diversity. Theorists such as
Rorty and Fish slip from the individualist to the collectivist position.
The collectivist position rests on the idea of a homogeneous
interpretive community, on unreflective solidarity with like-minded
persons.
The elements of the collectivist position are simplifications of
reality, traps for critical theorists. Accordingly, on the collectivist
view, the individual is merely a manifestation of the community,
identifiable by its shared value system or shared conceptual
framework. Disagreement is nothing more or less than a conversa-
tion among members of different interpretive communities. Truth
is nothing more than a label for the interpretive strategy that
happens to persuade and prevail in the conversation.
These collectivist theses are congenial to writers who assume
that the powerful and the powerless, the genders, and the several
races define discrete conceptual systems at war with one another,
and that nothing more can be said for judgments than that they
reflect one system or another. I have considered at length what is
wrong with the collectivist picture: it disregards the idiosyncratic
strategies of individuals, the stake each has in her strategies, the
implications of that stake for the use of terms like "truth" and
Fish extends his strictures to institutions/communities in which "members disagree
over interpretive strategies." See David Luban, Fish v. Fish or, Some Realism About
Idealism, 7 CARDozo L. REV. 693, 694 (1986).
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"objectivity," and the way in which the use of these terms illumi-
nates the tension between having a stake and being aware that one's
practices are not grounded in transcendental foundations (criteria
outside the practice itself). All of these dimensions of deliberative
practices are part of the individualist story, lost in the collectivist
story.
The individualist story is reflected in some recent writings by
jurisprudential neo-pragmatists. Thomas Grey describes "the
pragmatists' first thesis [as the view] that knowledge is essentially
contextual, situated in habit and practice.... .2 6  This thesis
implies "a kind of perspectivism. Because new beliefs emerge out
of a complex of already existing beliefs that can never be made fully
conscious and explicit, all useful beliefs may not ultimately prove
commensurable with each other."23 7 Applied to law, pragmatism
claims that law "is constituted of practices-contextual, situated,
rooted in custom and shared expectations," and that law is "instru-
mental, a means for achieving socially desired ends."
238
For individuals bound in a shared deliberative practice, the
deployment of shared and individual strategies of interpretation
serves ends which are themselves the subject of debate and
disagreement. Accordingly, Grey comments that "pragmatism
mediates between positivistic and instrumentalist conceptions of law
on the one hand and, on the other, idealist legal theories that
identify law with the aspiration to justice, and see legal ideas as
partly constitutive of social reality."23 9 Pragmatism, therefore,
reflects the individual decision-maker's commitment to a particular
stake in justice as well as her awareness of deliberation as an
instrumental practice serving controversial ends.
Grey also takes note of "pragmatism's peculiar rhetorical
disadvantages vis-6-vis other theories.... For pragmatists, any
theory is only a set of reflections on some existing practice,
generated out of and attached to that practice, recognizing its
contingency and cultural particularity."240 Rorty similarly dwells
26 Grey, supra note 201, at 799. The idea of knowledge and judgments as
relativistic, contingent, and historically based existed long before the arrival of
contemporary pragmatism; indeed, this concept played a central role in some major
strains of nineteenth-century and earlier social thought. See id. at 801-03.237 Id. at 804.
238 Id. at 805.
239 THOMAs C. GREY, THE WALLACE STEVENS CASE: LAW AND THE PRACTICE OF
POETRY 68-69 (1991).
240 Id. at 105.
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on "the banality of pragmatism" as a theory that largely "clears the
underbrush and leaves it to others to plant the forest."241 The
underbrush in this case is the foundational background of legal
formalism, representing the aspiration to make hard cases easy by
finding uncontroversial and acontextual modes of decision.
242
Some limits of pragmatism, seen as contextualism and instru-
mentalism, are brought out by Margaret Jane Radin when she asks,
"How can the pragmatist find a standpoint from which to argue that
a system is coherent but bad, if pragmatism defines truth and good
as coherence? Inattention to this problem is what makes pragma-
tism seem complacent, when it does." 243 Viewing the individual's
strategies as contextual and seeing the community as a context with
instrumental criteria for truth can be criticized as vague and banal.
It does not explain how the individual distinguishes himself from
the group, how disagreement within the group is possible, and how
it is resolved. Even when pragmatism does not take its collectivist
posture and identify the individual with the group, it still does not
give an account of the relationship between the two. It does not
wade deeply enough into the structure of deliberative practices.
CONCLUSION
Legal philosophers have generally spotlighted one act in the
complex drama of law and one question in a seamless web of issues.
The act is deliberation and decision-making by judges and the
question is how the nature of law manifests itself in judicial
deliberation. This preoccupation is shared by legal theorists who
share little else.
The metaphors and assumptions of legal theorists have charac-
teristically oversimplified judicial agreement and disagreement.
Some theorists see judges asjoint players of a game with identifiable
rules, rules that define which moves are allowed and what resources
241 Richard Rorty, The Banality of Pragmatism and The Poety ofJustice, 63 S. CAL.
L. REV. 1811, 1813, 1815 (1990) (discussing Posner's characterization of pragmatic
jurisprudence).
242 In that respect, pragmatism repeats the well-digested lessons of legal realism,
translated into lessons about language and understanding. Cf. id. at 1813 (stating that
"new pragmatists talk about language instead of experience or mind or consciousness
243 Margaret Radin, The Pragmatist and the Feminist, 63 S. CAL. L. REV. 1699, 1710
(1990). See also Frank Michelman, Private/Personal but Not Split: Radin Versus Rory,
63 S. CAL. L. REV. 1783 (1990) (comparing Rorty's pragmatic view of a public-private
split with Radin's rejection of such a dichotomy).
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can be used. But the game metaphor cannibalizes itself, in part
because the rules themselves are the subject of decision-making. An
even more misleading variant of the shared-rules model describes
judges as joint elaborators of a shared consensus about goals and
values.
On the other hand, it is equally misleading to ignore the ties
that bind judges into a shared practice. Some theorists, drawn to
a subtext of conflict for the sake of domination and of irreconcilable
conceptual schemes, flirt with solipsism of the individual or of the
group. They ignore that the individual judge is more than a locus
of idiosyncratic value or idiosyncratic techniques of understanding,
representative only of himself or his group. He is also a participant
in a shared practice with other judges, a deliberative practice in
which arguments are mutually understood and anticipated and in
which mutual influence can and does occur.
Seeing legal reasoning as a deliberative practice focuses
attention on two aspects of judging and its implications for law.
The first aspect is the complexity of each individual judge's ways of
understanding, of making and justifying decisions, and of determin-
ing what is and is not legally relevant to a particular case. The
arguments that she uses with justificatory force will be configured
in a way that reflects her unique way of understanding experience,
her knowledge-and her way of understanding the point of law and
laws. Her uniqueness is not simply a matter of ethics and politics
but a way of situating ethics and politics in a general scheme of
understanding.
The second aspect is that, if she is reflective, she will appreciate
that other judges have their own ways of understanding experience
and accordingly make different kinds of justificatory moves. Her
recognition of this, and her familiarity with the conceptual styles of
others, constitute her awareness of the joint deliberative practice.
This awareness is characterized by the tension between the
unavoidable and all-pervasive stake she has in her modes of
understanding and her understanding that she is just one of many
equally situated participants, that her ways of proceeding have no
special sanction. To divorce this last insight from the simultaneous
awareness of her stake and to imagine a position outside any
particular way of understanding is to divorce theory from practice.
Thinking of law as a deliberative practice allows us to reconceive
the fluidity and the boundedness of law. The concept of law refers
to several things. First, the law for each judge, and for each
observer, consists of decisions and justificatory arguments that that
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judge regards as appropriate given her ways of reasoning and her
sense of law's purposes. Second, the law may include the collection
of decisions and justificatory strategies that are mutually regarded
as legally relevant. Finally, the law may be said to refer to decisions
apart from the justificatory arguments supporting them.
This third account of law requires it to be possible to identify
decisions, identify the law, apart from underlying justificatory
arguments. I have argued that this is not possible. The first and
second account, however, are alternative ways of saying that law is
as fixed and as fluid as the justificatory strategies that are mutually
recognized as relevant.
If Wittgenstein is right, and if philosophy "leaves everything as
it is," then describing law as a deliberative practice can be neither
conservative nor radical. The law itself, the deliberative practice
that is law, will be conservative if the society is homogeneous or
successfully repressive, if new voices and ways of thinking remain
unrepresented. The law will be radical if society is heterogeneous
and new ways ofjustifying and conceiving aims are continually given
legal expression. The law will, furthermore, be liberal in Mill's
sense whenever it is open to new ways of thinking, whenever judges
recognize that their ways of reasoning and justifying, i.e. their stake,
do not necessarily have hegemony.
